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Goddard: When It's the First Time Every Time: Eliminating the "Clean Slat

WHEN IT’S THE FIRST TIME EVERY TIME:
ELIMINATING THE “CLEAN SLATE” OF
PRETRIAL DIVERSIONS IN DOMESTIC
VIOLENCE CRIMES
I. INTRODUCTION
In the early morning hours of Christmas 2010, two of Samantha
Miller’s six children placed a frantic call to police. The children, ages
twelve and thirteen, told the emergency dispatcher that their mother’s
boyfriend, Timothy Putnam, had been arguing with their mother and
was holding her by her hair with a gun in his hand. When police arrived
on the scene shortly after 2:40 a.m., they found Samantha with a gunshot
wound to her head. She was transported to a local hospital, then
transferred to Vanderbilt Medical Center where she died from her
injuries. Samantha was a U.S. Army Veteran and Putnam was a military
police officer at Fort Campbell, Kentucky at the time of the murder.
Putnam initially told police he shot his girlfriend by accident. He later
pleaded no contest to second-degree murder and was sentenced to
fifteen years in prison.1
Sadly, this was not the first time Putnam committed a domestic
violence crime. In May 2009, he was arrested after he fired a gun at his
then-wife in front of their children. In that incident, Putnam put a
revolver to his head and threatened to kill himself. When the woman
grabbed her three young children and ran from the house, he fired a shot
into a desk. Prosecutors charged Putnam with domestic assault and
three counts of reckless endangerment in conjunction with that episode.
As a result, the court ordered Putnam to participate in domestic abuse
and psychiatric counseling, and he received pretrial diversions on all
charges.2
In cases like Putnam’s, pretrial diversions offer a clean slate to
offenders who successfully comply with specified terms for a short
Mom Dies After Christmas Morning Shooting, Boyfriend Charged, WKRN (Dec. 25, 2010,
2:41
PM),
http://www.wkrn.com/Global/story.asp?S=13740278,
archived
at
http://perma.cc/9BRU-8UH7; Timothy Putnam Pleads No Contest to Second Degree Murder,
LEAF CHRON., http://www.theleafchronicle.com/VideoNetwork/2111917230001/Timothy
-Putnam-pleads-no-contest-to-second-degree-murder (last visited Mar. 5, 2015), archived at
http://perma.cc/9BRU-8UH7; Soldier Pleads in Murder Case, EAGLE POST (Jan. 23, 2013),
http://www.theeaglepost.us/fort_campbell/article_031706a4-6510-11e2-8d45-001a4bcf887
a.html, archived at http://perma.cc/XZG4-DE58.
2
Military Police Officer Charged in Christmas Shooting Has History of Domestic Violence,
WOMEN’S SELF DEF. FED’N (Dec. 30, 2010), http://womenselfdefensefederation.com/
military-police-officer-charged-in-christmas-shooting-has-history-of-domestic-violence,
archived at http://perma.cc/MRU-48DK.
1
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period of time, usually six months to one year.3 At the end of that term,
the prosecution dismisses the charges, which may then be expunged
from the abuser’s criminal history.4 For Putnam, this meant he would
maintain his employment as a military police officer and would continue
to own a firearm—a consequence that proved deadly for Samantha
Miller.
Stories like this one are far too common.5 Victims of domestic abuse
predominantly consist of women and children, while the vast majority of
abusers are men.6 In fact, one in four women will become a victim of
3
See infra notes 78–80 and accompanying text (discussing the length of pretrial
diversion agreements and commonly related treatment program requirements).
4
See infra notes 81–82 and accompanying text (evaluating the result of successful
completion of a pretrial diversion agreement in various jurisdictions).
5
See Diana Moskovitz & Jared Goyette, Father of 10-year-old Boy Killed in Aventura is
Found Dead, SUN SENTINEL (Mar. 12, 2010), http://articles.sun-sentinel.com/2010-0312/news/fl-aventura-kid-shot-update-20100312_1_aventura-police-sunny-isles-beachpetition, archived at http://perma.cc/3WQ4-BLMT (describing the murder of a ten-year-old
boy by his father). Erasmo Reina Moreno shot and killed his ten-year-old son, Esteban
Reina Raigoso, before turning the gun on himself. Id. This tragedy occurred despite
Moreno having had his gun previously confiscated by police following a prior domestic
violence arrest. Id. The prior offense, committed against his wife while she was eight
months pregnant, had been disposed of through a pretrial diversion. Id.; see also Mindrey
Rodriguez-Sanchez, UNTIL DEATH DO US PART (Dec. 8, 2007), http://dvwatch.blogspot.com/
2007_12_01_archive.html, archived at http://perma.cc/J86D-2W6U (describing the murder
of Mindrey Rodriguez-Sanchez). On December 4, 2007, Humberto Cruz shot his estranged
wife, Mindrey Rodriguez-Sanchez, to death and left her body in the doorway of his
Christmas-lit house in Tampa, Florida. Id. Cruz had been arrested in September 2007 for
choking his wife and received a pretrial diversion. Id. Within hours of the murder, Cruz
committed suicide, and the couple left behind two daughters, ages eight and four. Id.; see
also Sara Israelsen, Shocked Orem Neighbors Describe ‘Loving Pair,’ DESERET NEWS (Oct. 18,
2006),
http://www.deseretnews.com/article/650199607/Shocked-Orem-neighborsdescribe-loving-pair.html, archived at http://perma.cc/35LC-9832 (describing the murder
of Tonja Nash). Keith Morton received a diversion-like program stemming from an
incident on Thanksgiving 2005 in which he attempted to strangle his girlfriend Tonja Nash.
Id. He was still under the terms of that program on October 16, 2006 when he murdered
the mother of two. Id. A report of the Utah Domestic Violence Council describes the attack
in detail:
Neighbors said when Tonja Marie Nash ran from the house she didn’t
get far. Keith Lamont Morton pointed a shotgun and fired into her
back. Morton then aimed at the fallen Tonja’s head and pulled the
trigger a second time before kicking her motionless body and walking
back inside. . . . Following the shooting [her] two boys ran to their
mother’s bleeding body. Tonja was still alive when police arrived but
she was pronounced dead when she arrived at a hospital.
UTAH DOMESTIC VIOLENCE COUNCIL, UTAH DOMESTIC VIOLENCE RELATED DEATHS 2006, 13–
14, http://udvc.org/media/PDF/deaths/deaths_2006.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/
HRJ5-7VMA.
6
See MATTHEW R. DUROSE ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS,
FAMILY VIOLENCE STATISTICS 1 (June 2005), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/index.
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domestic violence within her lifetime.7
Domestic batterers have
frighteningly high rates of recidivism.8 Despite the passage of state and
federal laws to restrict the possession of firearms by batterers, more than
three women per day are murdered by their husbands or boyfriends.9
Although the presence of a firearm greatly endangers the safety of
women involved in abusive relationships, research suggests that limiting
abusers’ access to guns will result in less lethal domestic violence.10
The pervasiveness of various forms of domestic violence in the
United States indicates that the criminal justice system’s methods to
resolve such cases are in desperate need of reform. Currently, most
jurisdictions have some type of mandatory arrest laws.11 These laws
cfm?ty=pbdetail&iid=828, archived at http://perma.cc/DKA3-KJYV (providing statistics on
domestic violence and gender). According to the U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of
Justice Statistics, in a study of family violence between 1993 and 2002, 73% of family
violence victims were female and 75 percent of perpetrators of family violence were male.
Id. This Note will examine domestic violence crimes and the impact of their disposition on
women, as does a great deal of the literature on the topic. This is a reflection of national
statistics and is not intended to ignore the existence of male domestic violence victims.
7
See NAT’L COALITION AGAINST DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE FACTS 1, 2
(July 2007), available at http://www.ncadv.org/files/DomesticViolenceFactSheet
(National).pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/6JEJ-43AR [hereinafter DOMESTIC VIOLENCE
FACTS] (citing PATRICIA TJADEN & NANCY THOENNES, NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE AND
THE CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, EXTENT, NATURE, AND
CONSEQUENCES OF INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE: FINDINGS FROM THE NATIONAL VIOLENCE
AGAINST WOMEN SURVEY, NCJRS (2000)) (providing statistics on the prevalence of domestic
violence in the United States).
8
See infra note 120 and accompanying text (discussing the tendency of domestic abusers
to reoffend).
9
See Get the Facts: The Facts on Domestic, Dating and Sexual Violence, FUTURES WITHOUT
VIOLENCE,
http://www.futureswithoutviolence.org/content/action_center/detail/754
(last visited May 30, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/55KE-PVR7 (quoting SHANNAN
CATALANO, Intimate Partner Violence in the United States, U.S. DEP’T. JUST. (2007),
http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/ipvus.pdf (last visited March 5, 2014), archived at
perma.cc/GQ84-U2PP).
10
See JOHNS HOPKINS BLOOMBERG SCH. PUB. HEALTH, INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE AND
FIREARMS FACT SHEET 1, 2, available at http://www.jhsph.edu/research/centers-andinstitutes/johns-hopkins-center-for-gun-policy-and-research/publications/IPV_Guns.pdf,
archived at http://perma.cc/3WYS-6HZN [hereinafter INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE AND
FIREARMS FACT SHEET] (providing statistics on the relationship between firearms access and
domestic violence related homicide). Domestic abuse involving firearms is twelve times
more likely to result in death than non-firearm abuse. Id.; see also infra notes 107–11 and
accompanying text (discussing the increased danger firearms present in abusive
relationships).
11
See AM. BAR ASS’N COMM’N OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE ARREST
POLICIES
BY
STATE
(2007),
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/
migrated/domviol/docs/Domestic_Violence_Arrest_Policies_by_State_11_07.authcheckda
m.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/NKF2-3D96 (listing the relevant statute pertaining to
domestic violence arrest laws in each state and classifying arrest policies into three general
categories: officer’s discretion, mandatory arrest, and pro-arrest).
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frequently exist in conjunction with no-drop policies in prosecutor’s
offices.12 In stark contrast to this outwardly stringent approach, a
common practice in many states involves the use of pretrial diversion
programs.13 These diversions require an offender to complete a brief
period of probation and pay a fine.14 In exchange, the prosecution drops
the charges and the offender does not receive a conviction.15
Although pretrial diversions provide a swift and efficient means of
resolving cases, they are inherently problematic in domestic violence
situations.16 Part II of this Note describes current laws and common
practices related to domestic violence crimes.17 Part III analyzes the use
of pretrial diversion programs as a resolution to criminal domestic
violence charges.18 Finally, Part IV will propose eliminating the use of
pretrial diversions in domestic violence prosecutions and will include
three possible avenues for implementation of such a policy.19
II. BACKGROUND
The judicial system’s approach to domestic violence has evolved
significantly and currently includes several factors, which are considered
in this Note. Part II.A defines domestic violence.20 Part II.B explores the

12
See infra notes 54–62 and accompanying text (explaining varying degrees of no-drop
policies employed by prosecutors in domestic violence cases).
13
See infra notes 88–90 and accompanying text (discussing the prevalence of pretrial
diversion programs as a means of resolving domestic violence prosecutions).
14
See Clifford Ward, Kane County Unveils New Effort to Treat, Counsel Certain Domestic
Abusers, CHI. TRIB. (Oct. 13, 2010), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2010-10-13/news/ctmet-kane-domestic-violence-1014-20101013_1_mutual-ground-domestic-abusers-domesticviolence, archived at http://perma.cc/C3GX-2VGP (detailing the terms of Kane County,
Illinois’ formal diversion program for domestic violence). Offenders participating in the
Kane County program are required to pay a $450 fee and make a $200 donation to a
domestic violence shelter, in addition to completing a specified course of counseling or
other treatment within one year. Id.
15
See id. (providing that program participants are initially required to plead guilty to
domestic violence, but upon successful completion of the program’s terms, the charge will
be dropped).
16
See infra notes 139–44 and accompanying text (exploring the consequences that arise
from the use of pretrial diversions in domestic violence cases).
17
See infra Part II (describing current federal and state laws pertaining to and triggered
by domestic violence crimes and also examining relevant law enforcement and judicial
practices).
18
See infra Part III (analyzing the use of pretrial diversion programs in domestic violence
crimes).
19
See infra Part IV (proposing that the use of pretrial diversion programs should be
prohibited in prosecutions of domestic violence offenses).
20
See infra Part II.A (providing statutory and social science definitions of domestic
violence).
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progression of judicial processing of domestic abuse crimes.21 Part II.C
defines pretrial diversion in the context of this Note.22 Part II.D
highlights some of the common scenarios in which pretrial diversion
programs are employed.23 Part II.E evaluates factors that impact the way
domestic violence cases are prosecuted.24
A. Definition of Domestic Violence
Acts of domestic violence are as varied as they are prevalent, with
definitions provided by statutes as well as by social sciences.25 Domestic
violence is generally regarded as a pattern of abusive behavior used by
one partner to gain or maintain control and power over the other
partner, and can be physical, sexual, emotional, psychological, or
economic, and can consist of actions or threats that influence another
person.26 This can include any behaviors that attempt to intimidate,
21
See infra Part II.B (explaining the emergence of several practices and policies used in
domestic violence situations).
22
See infra Part II.C (discussing the elements of pretrial diversions and limiting the
context in which it is discussed in this Note).
23
See infra Part II.D (listing typical applications of pretrial diversions in criminal
prosecutions).
24
See infra Part II.E (exploring legal and social issues related to domestic violence
prosecutions).
25
See IND. CODE § 34-6-2-34.5 (2014) (defining domestic violence). Indiana statute
provides:
“Domestic or family violence” means, except for an act of self-defense,
the occurrence of at least one (1) of the following acts committed by a
family or household member:
(1) Attempting to cause, threatening to cause or causing physical
harm to another family member or household member.
(2) Placing a family or household member in fear of physical harm.
(3) Causing a family or household member to involuntarily engage
in sexual activity by force, threat of force, or duress.
(4) Beating (as described in IC 35-46-3-0.5(2)), torturing (as defined in
IC 35-46-3-0.5(5)), mutilating (as defined in IC 35-46-3-0.5(3)), or
killing a vertebrate animal without justification with the intent to
threaten, intimidate, coerce, harass, or terrorize a family or
household member.
For purposes of IC 34-26-5, domestic and family violence also includes
stalking (as defined in IC 35-45-10-1) or a sex offense under IC 35-42-4,
whether or not the stalking or sex offense is committed by a family or
household member.
Id.
26
See Domestic Violence:
What is Domestic Violence?, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE,
http://www.ovw.usdoj.gov/domviolence.htm (last visited Mar. 5, 2014), archived at
http://perma.cc/9GH5-JFLM [hereinafter Domestic Violence] (defining domestic violence).
Physical abuse can consist of hitting, slapping, shoving, grabbing, pinching, biting, hair
pulling, etc., as well as forcing drugs or alcohol on a partner or denying medical care. Id.
Sexual abuse involves coercing or attempting to coerce sexual contact without consent,
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humiliate, isolate, frighten, terrorize, threaten, hurt, or wound a
partner.27
The progressive pattern of violence in abusive relationships can have
fatal consequences.28 In 2007, 2340 deaths in the United States were
related to domestic violence, accounting for approximately 14% of all
homicides.29 Domestic violence accounts for 40–50% of all murders of
women in the United States, and in 70–80% of homicides, regardless
which intimate partner was murdered, the male partner was found to
have physically abused the female partner prior to the murder.30 These
including, but not limited to, rape, attacks on sexual parts of the body, or treating a partner
in a sexually demeaning way. Id. Emotional abuse includes undermining a partner’s selfworth, including chronic criticism, name-calling, or damaging a partner’s relationship with
her children. Id. Psychological abuse can include creating fear through intimidation,
threatening physical harm to a partner or others, destroying property, harming pets, or
isolating a partner from family, friends, school, or work. Id. Economic abuse involves
attempts to make a partner financially dependent by fully controlling financial resources,
withholding a partner’s access to money, or forbidding a partner’s attendance at school or
work. Id. See also EMILY SACK, FAMILY VIOLENCE PREVENTION FUND, CREATING A DOMESTIC
VIOLENCE COURT: GUIDELINES AND BEST PRACTICES 23 (2002), http://www.futures
withoutviolence.org/userfiles/file/Judicial/FinalCourt_Guidelines.pdf,
archived
at
http://perma.cc/L4VT-YZH3 (discussing the need for judges to understand that domestic
violence is a pattern of abuse).
27
See Domestic Violence, supra note 26 (providing descriptions of various types of
domestic violence). Anyone can be a victim of domestic violence, regardless of race, age,
sexual orientation, religion, or gender. Id. Such abuse happens at all socioeconomic
backgrounds and education levels, and occurs in opposite-sex and same-sex relationships,
involving partners who are married, cohabitating, or dating. Id. Domestic abuse extends
beyond the partners involved to affect family members, friends, co-workers, and other
witnesses, in addition to society as a whole. Id. Witnessing domestic violence also
predisposes children to physical and social problems and increases their risk of becoming
abusers or victims in the future by teaching them that such abuse is an acceptable way of
life. Id.
28
See NAT’L CTR. FOR INJURY PREVENTION & CONTROL, UNDERSTANDING INTIMATE
PARTNER VIOLENCE FACT SHEET, CDC 1 (2012), available at http://www.cdc.gov/
violenceprevention/pdf/ipv-factsheet.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/7ZHZ-9TBJ
(discussing the progression of violence in abusive relationships). Domestic violence often
begins with emotional abuse and progresses into physical or sexual assault. Id. Physical
assault is characterized by the use of physical force against another person. Id. The longer
a victim stays in an abusive relationship, the more dangerous the situation becomes. Id.
The effects of domestic violence may include isolation, depression, physical injuries, rape,
or death. Id.
29
Id. (citing Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics). Of these deaths, 70%
were female. UNDERSTANDING INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE FACT SHEET, supra note 28, at
1.
30
See Jacquelyn C. Campbell et al., Assessing Risk Factors for Intimate Partner Homicide,
250 NAT’L INST. JUST. J. 14, 18 (Nov. 2003), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/jr000250e.pdf,
archived at http://perma.cc/R989-2PKG (reporting the findings of a danger assessment
study that revealed women are killed by domestic violence more often than by any other
category of killer). Women threatened or assaulted with a gun by a partner are twenty
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staggering statistics highlight the need for improvement in the criminal
justice system’s processing of domestic violence cases.
B. Judicial Treatment of Domestic Violence Cases
Historically, domestic violence in the United States justice system
was not treated as a serious criminal matter.31 Rather, society viewed
women as the property of their husbands, and wives were to be
disciplined as husbands saw fit.32 Familial privacy was more important
than protecting women from abuse.33 For example, courts accepted that
a man could whip his wife as long as the switch he used was no larger
than his thumb.34 To the extent that the legal system had any
involvement with domestic matters, it was merely to establish guidelines

times more likely to be killed then other women. Id. at 16. Also, women threatened with
murder by a partner are fifteen times more likely to be murdered. Id. These findings also
revealed that female victims of domestic violence greatly underestimate the danger of their
relationship. Id.
31
See MELISSA REULAND ET AL., POLICE-COMMUNITY PARTNERSHIPS TO ADDRESS
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, OFFICE OF COMMUNITY ORIENTED POLICING SERVICES 3,
http://www.cops.usdoj.gov/Publications/domestic_violence_web3.pdf (last visited Oct.
16, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/6DWK-N2V2 (citing “noninterference” as the
primary response of law enforcement officers to domestic violence situations). Although
police were responsible for intervening in family violence, they typically had no recourse
when responding to such calls and were directed not to make an arrest unless the victim
was severely injured or the police officer personally witnessed the commission of the
abuse. Id.
32
See State v. Black, 60 N.C. 266, 267 (1864) (providing justification for the position that a
man can use physical means to discipline his wife, and guidelines for such discipline). The
court stated:
A husband is responsible for the acts of his wife, and he is required to
govern his household, and for that purpose the law permits him to use
towards his wife such a degree of force as is necessary to control an
unruly temper and make her behave herself; and unless some
permanent injury be inflicted, or there be an excess of violence, or such
a degree of cruelty as shows that it is inflicted to gratify his own bad
passions, the law will not invade the domestic forum or go behind the
curtain. It prefers to leave the parties to themselves, as the best mode
of inducing them to make the matter up and live together as man and
wife should.
Id.
33
See, e.g., State v. Rhodes, 61 N.C. 453, 457 (1868) (holding that “however great are the
evils of ill temper, quarrels, and even personal conflicts inflicting only temporary pain, they
are not comparable with the evils which would result from raising the curtain, and
exposing to public curiosity and criticism, the nursery and the bed chamber”).
34
See id. at 454 (citing the lower court’s finding that a man had a right to whip his wife
“with a switch no larger than his thumb”); Black, 60 N.C. at 267 (finding that a man has the
right to use force against his wife as necessary to “make her behave herself”).
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by which such family discipline should occur.35 In 1871, Alabama was
the first state to rescind the legal right of men to beat their wives.36
Over time, society’s position on domestic abuse began to change and
increased awareness of its existence led to legal changes.37 Organizations
emerged and provided services to victims of domestic violence, mainly
women and children.38 One of the first domestic violence shelters
opened in Maine in 1967.39 In 1984, The Duluth Project became the
country’s first coordinated criminal justice response model for domestic
violence.40 Later that year, Congress passed the Family Violence
Prevention and Services Act, which specifically designated federal funds
for programs designed to serve women and children who were victims
of domestic violence.41 The federal government took action by enacting

Rhodes, 61 N.C. at 458. The court disagreed with the lower court’s position, but found
the defendant not guilty based on the notion that family privacy was a greater priority than
domestic violence. Id. The court reasoned:
It will be observed that the ground upon which we have put this
decision is not that the husband has the right to whip his wife much or
little; but that we will not interfere with family government in trifling
cases. We will no more interfere where the husband whips the wife
than where the wife whips the husband; and yet we would hardly be
supposed to hold that a wife has a right to whip her husband. We will
not inflict upon society the greater evil of raising the curtain upon
domestic privacy, to punish the lesser evil of trifling violence.
Id. at 459.
36
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, THE HISTORY OF THE VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN ACT, available at
http://www.ovw.usdoj.gov/docs/history-vawa.pdf (last visited Oct. 16, 2014), archived at
http://perma.cc/4CZA-7GXF [hereinafter HISTORY OF THE VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN
ACT].
37
See REULAND ET AL., supra note 31, at 3 (discussing the evolution of societal norms and
the impact on law enforcement response to intimate partner violence).
38
See id. at 4–5 (defining coalitions and explaining their focus as well as Coordinated
Community Response (“CCR”) models). These coalitions promote understanding of the
domestic violence problem, assess current practices, and create mechanisms for sharing
information between agencies and organizations. Id. at 5.
39
HISTORY OF THE VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN ACT, supra note 36.
40
Id.; Home of the Duluth Model: Social Change to End Violence Against Women, DAIP,
http://www.theduluthmodel.org/about/index.html (last visited Oct. 16, 2014), archived at
http://perma.cc/QD8W-3M82. The Duluth Model approach “[h]as ongoing discussions
between criminal and civil justice agencies, community members and victims to close gaps
and improve the community’s response to battering.” Id.
41
HISTORY OF THE VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN ACT, supra note 36. The Family Violence
Prevention and Services Act (“FVPSA”) is the largest source of funding for emergency
services offered to domestic violence victims and their children, providing emergency
shelters, crisis lines, counseling, and victim assistance. Id. Congress authorized $175
million per year for FVPSA programs, but programs for children have not been enacted
because FVPSA has been funded below $130 million each year between 2002 and 2007. Id.
at 1–2. FVPSA provides funding to over 2000 domestic violence shelters and safe-houses
that provide core services, including physical shelter and protection for victims and
35
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the Violence Against Women Act (“VAWA”) as part of the Violent
Congress
Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994.42
reauthorized and expanded VAWA in 2000, 2006, and 2013, establishing
new programs and strengthening federal laws.43 Domestic violence and
its effects received a great deal of attention in 2014 following media
reports that several National Football League players were involved in
domestic abuse incidents.44
As society’s view of the problem continued to change and the federal
government took action, state policies also evolved.45 Although police
children, hotline services, individual and group counseling, legal assistance, and referrals
to other community services. Id. at 1.
42
42 U.S.C. § 13981 (2012). This legislation requires a coordinated community response
to domestic violence and other crimes against women, creates full faith and credit
provisions to ensure that states enforce orders for protection that have been issued in other
states, allows domestic violence victims to seek civil rights remedies, and provides federal
funding for training of law enforcement and prosecutors as well as funding for victim’s
service organizations such as shelters and education programs. HISTORY OF THE VIOLENCE
AGAINST WOMEN ACT, supra note 36.
43
See id. (discussing the VAWA legislation that was signed into law in 2000 and 2006).
As a result of VAWA, the Office on Violence Against Women (“OVW”) was created in 1995
and became an independent office within the Department of Justice in 2003. FAITH TRUST
INSTITUTE, HISTORY OF VAWA 2, available at http://www.ncdsv.org/images/
historyofvawa.pdf (last visited Nov. 20, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/48UY-YNTP.
The OVW is responsible for legal and policy issues relating to violence against women,
coordinates departmental efforts, provides technical assistance to communities across the
country, and responds to requests for information regarding violence against women. Id.
OVW has awarded over $1.6 billion in grants, consisting of over 3700 discretionary grants
and 500 STOP (Services, Training, Officers, Prosecutors) grants to states and territories. Id.
These grants help state, tribal, and local governments and agencies train personnel and
establish programs to help victims of violence and hold perpetrators accountable. Id. at 2–
3. VAWA programs are also implemented by the Department of Health and Human
Services (“HHS”) which administers the National Domestic Violence Hotline and has
expanded resources for domestic violence programs and shelters, and raises awareness of
domestic violence in workplaces and among health care providers. Id. at 3. HHS also
provides states with grants for rape prevention and education programs and helps build
new community programs designed to prevent domestic violence. Id.
44
Chris Serico, ‘No More’: NFL Stars, Celebs Team Up for Domestic Violence PSAs, TODAY
NEWS (Oct. 22, 2014), available at http://www.today.com/news/no-more-nfl-stars-celebsteam-domestic-violence-psas-1D80232711, archived at http://perma.cc/D64X-GCDU.
These incidents prompted NFL Commissioner Roger Goodell to collaborate with
representatives of nineteen organizations and groups to discuss issues of domestic violence
and sexual assault. Id. In addition to the PSA campaign, an NFL spokeswoman said that
the NFL has “started to revise the league’s conduct policy; begun conducting mandatory
education sessions for league owners, players and personnel; and explored programs to
promote character development and healthy relationships among children and young
adults who play football.” Id.
45
See H. Morley Swingle et al., Unhappy Families: Prosecuting and Defending Domestic
Violence Cases, 58 J. MO. B. 220, 221 (2002) (discussing changes Missouri implemented in his
handling of domestic violence situations). Missouri’s creation of the crime of domestic
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officers became increasingly active in domestic violence situations, their
biases created a tendency that domestic abuse crimes were not pursued
as vigorously as other violent crimes.46 Police officers were generally
hesitant to arrest batterers and invest time in taking reports because so
few cases were prosecuted.47
Eventually police officers began to enforce warrantless arrest
policies, authorized by state statute.48 In considering the intentions of
such practices, one scholar noted “[w]arrantless arrests mean immediate
arrests are possible, further injury to the victim is avoided, and violent
behavior is punished.”49 Mandatory arrest policies go further than
The mandatory arrest policies that
warrantless arrest statutes.50
currently exist in many jurisdictions mean that police officers responding
to a call involving domestic abuse must arrest the perpetrator if there is
probable cause for the officer to believe that abuse has occurred.51 The
assault in the second degree elevates the level of a violent offense that would have been a
misdemeanor if committed against a stranger, to a felony when the victim is an intimate
partner. Id. (citing MO. REV. STAT. § 565.070 (2000)). See generally HISTORY OF THE VIOLENCE
AGAINST WOMEN ACT, supra note 36 (providing a timeline of significant events concerning
society and the government’s response to violence against women); Jessica M. Eaglin,
Neorehabilitation and Indiana’s Sentencing Reform Dilemma, 47 VAL. U. L. REV. 867, 874 (2013)
(discussing the addition of specialized courts in Indiana, including domestic violence
courts).
46
See Gena L. Durham, Note, The Domestic Violence Dilemma: How Our Ineffective and
Varied Responses Reflect Our Conflicted Views of the Problem, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 641, 648 (1998)
(comparing police response to domestic violence crimes to the response in other violent
crimes).
47
See Diane E. Reynolds, Note, The Use of Pretrial Diversion Programs in Spouse Abuse
Cases: A New Solution to an Old Problem, 3 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 415, 420 (1988)
(discussing the evolution of police handling of domestic violence cases).
48
See REULAND ET AL., supra note 31, at 1 (summarizing the changes in law enforcement
response to domestic violence as societal norms evolved from treating domestic violence as
a family matter to recognizing that domestic violence is as much a crime as a battery
committed upon a stranger); Reynolds, supra note 47, at 420 (discussing warrantless arrest
statutes as “an important step in triggering the criminal justice system to reduce violence”).
49
Reynolds, supra note 47, at 420. Reynolds also notes negative implications of more
frequent arrests, including the likelihood that the offender will become angrier and more
abusive, fewer incidents may be reported as victims do not want to see batterers arrested
and prosecuted, and that more frequent arrests without prosecution weakens the message
that domestic violence is a crime. Id. at 420–21. However, these problems are often
outweighed by the benefits of more frequent arrests. Id. at 420. For example, increased
arrests leads to more frequent prosecutions, a greater likelihood of victim cooperation, and
conveys the message that an abuser has committed a crime and a victim has a right not to
be abused. Id. at 420–21.
50
See Erin L. Han, Note, Mandatory Arrest and No-Drop Policies: Victim Empowerment in
Domestic Violence Cases, 23 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 159, 174 (2003) (comparing mandatory
arrest policies to warrantless arrest statutes).
51
Id. In some states, officers are required to arrest a batterer, even if the victim is
unwilling to testify. REULAND ET AL., supra note 31, at 4. These mandatory arrest laws have
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distinction between warrantless arrest and mandatory arrest lies in the
ability of the officer to use his discretion—in warrantless arrests he may
choose whether to arrest a batterer, whereas mandatory arrest policies
require him to make an arrest regardless of his assessment of the
situation.52 These policies are often coupled with mandatory prosecution
policies once a batterer is arrested.53
The effect of a mandatory prosecution, or no-drop policy, is that a
prosecutor files charges against a suspect arrested for domestic battery
and moves forward with the prosecution, regardless of the wishes of the
victim.54 These prosecutorial policies may vary somewhat between
jurisdictions, with some offices having hard no-drop policies, while
others employ non-coercive no-drop policies.55 A hard no-drop policy
been praised by advocates because the result is that victims no longer have to press charges
against their abuser. Id. In light of evidence suggesting that arrest or prosecution policies
alone may not prevent repeat domestic violence, many police agencies are attempting to
enhance their responses to domestic violence victims through partnerships with
community resources and other criminal justice agencies that make victim safety a priority.
Id.
52
Han, supra note 50, at 174. Han analyzes four characterizations of mandatory arrest
policies:
1) that they are disempowering because they take away control from
victims of domestic violence; 2) that they empower victims by showing
that the state will support their efforts to leave their batterers; 3) that
mandatory arrest policies do take control away from victims, but that
this usurpation of control is warranted while the victim is
incapacitated by trauma; and 4) that this stage in law enforcement is
neither empowering nor disempowering because it need not involve
the victim at all, but is a matter between the defendant and the state.
Id. at 175 (citations omitted); see Tom B. Bricker, Bad Application of a Bad Standard: The
Bungling of Georgia v. Randolph’s Third-Party Consent Law, 44 VAL. U. L. REV. 423, 457–58
(2010) (discussing the third-party consent law as it relates to police responses to domestic
violence).
53
See Reynolds, supra note 47, at 421 (discussing the correlation between arrests and
prosecutions of domestic violence crimes). “[T]he willingness of police to arrest batterers
becomes a function of the prosecutor’s willingness to follow up those arrests with
prosecution.” Id. at 422. Prosecutors are using a wider range of available options for
handling domestic violence cases and policies vary greatly between jurisdictions.
REULAND ET AL., supra note 31, at 1. These options include no-drop policies, evidencebased prosecution, and special district attorneys who are specifically assigned to domestic
violence cases. Id.
54
See Durham, supra note 46, at 650 (describing the characteristics of no-drop policies).
No-drop prosecution began in the late 1980s largely due to high rates of dismissals of
domestic violence cases in which the victim was not willing to testify. Robert C. Davis,
Barbara E. Smith & Heather J. Davies, Effects of No-Drop Prosecution of Domestic Violence
Upon Conviction Rates, 3 JUST. RES. & POL’Y 2 (Fall 2001), available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/
pdffiles1/Photocopy/193235NCJRS.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/6GDK-EVZU.
55
See Davis et al., supra note 54, at 3 (discussing the differences between “hard” versus
“soft” no-drop policies); Han, supra note 50, at 181 (describing the characteristics of no-drop
policies).
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means that the state will use any and all means available to pursue the
prosecution, including using evidence such as testimony of police
officers, neighbors, and the excited utterances of the victim at the time of
the abuse.56 Strict versions of this policy can include the requirement
that a victim testify or face prosecution for contempt for her refusal to
testify.57 Under the most extreme no-drop policies, a victim risks
prosecution for false reporting or perjury if she subsequently recants a
statement she made to a police officer indicating that abuse had
occurred.58 Justifications for this approach include victim safety, the
benefit of society, emotional empowerment of victims, and even
constitutional concerns based on equal protection violations.59

56
See Swingle et al., supra note 45, at 223–24 (discussing methods available to
prosecutors when victims are uncooperative and explaining that the test for admissibility
of an excited utterance is “whether a particular statement was made under such
circumstances as to indicate trustworthiness”).
An uncooperative victim’s prior
inconsistent statement may be admissible as substantive evidence if she testifies at trial, but
absent her testimony, there is nothing with which her prior statement is inconsistent. Id. at
223. See also Han, supra note 50, at 181 (explaining the implications of hard no-drop
policies). Han suggests that such policies are actually detrimental to victims in domestic
violence cases because of their rigidity and the potential consequences to victims who do
not comply to the prosecutor’s satisfaction. Id.
57
Durham, supra note 46, at 650. See Margaret E. Bell et al., Battered Women’s Perceptions
of Civil and Criminal Court Helpfulness: The Role of Court Outcomes and Processes, 17 VIOLENCE
AGAINST WOMEN 71, 82 (2011) (discussing the benefits and risks of mandatory policies).
Advocates believe these mandatory policies are beneficial in that they transfer
responsibility for arrest and prosecution from the victim to the legal system, making the
victim less susceptible to coercion to drop the charges. Id.
58
Telephone Interview with Jeffrey D. Drinski, Prosecutor, Newton County, Indiana
(Sept. 23, 2013) [hereinafter Drinski Interview]. Drinski notes that this approach can be
problematic because it may deter a victim from reporting domestic violence incidents out
of fear that she may face prosecution herself. Id. Drinski suggests that such a technique
should be reserved for abuse involving severe injuries or in cases where there is a long
history of repeat violence. Id.; see Swingle et al., supra note 45, at 222 (stating that holding a
victim in contempt of court should only be used as a last resort in order to avoid further
victimization); Linda G. Mills, Commentary, Killing Her Softly: Intimate Abuse and the
Violence of State Intervention, 113 HARV. L. REV. 550, 556 (1999) (“state actors’ abusive
posture toward survivors comes dangerously close to mirroring the violence in the
battering relationship.”).
59
Han, supra note 50, at 181–82; see Kalyani Robbins, Note, No-Drop Prosecution of
Domestic Violence: Just Good Policy, or Equal Protection Mandate?, 52 STAN. L. REV. 205, 206,
223–24 (1999) (suggesting that no-drop policies are constitutionally mandated based on the
notion that police and prosecutors responding differently to domestic violence than to
stranger assaults constitutes discrimination in the state’s provision of police protection,
thus violating the victim’s right to equal protection). But see Davis et al., supra note 54, at 10
(criticizing no-drop policies for their negative effect upon a victim’s willingness to call the
police when she becomes a victim of domestic violence). Critics of no-drop policies also
argue that victims may be placed in greater jeopardy because prosecution may “result in
blind anger and retaliation at the most convenient target—the victim.” Id. at 11.
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In contrast to hard no-drop policies, a non-coercive no-drop policy
allows a victim to make decisions regarding the extent of her own
involvement in the prosecution.60 In the event that the victim chooses
not to cooperate, the prosecutor retains the authority to make the
decision as to whether the prosecution will continue on the basis of other
evidence.61 Further, some jurisdictions employing non-coercive no-drop
policies require a victim to receive counseling from a victim advocate
about the domestic violence cycle before she withdraws her
One scholar suggests that the criminal justice
cooperation.62
community’s investment of time and resources in attempting to meet the
needs of a victim often results in her increased willingness to cooperate
in the prosecution of her abuser.63
In terms of prosecuting domestic violence, it is worth noting that
state statutes differ in terms of the type of relationship that must exist
between the parties under domestic violence laws.64 Generally, the
60
Han, supra note 50, at 187. A third type of prosecutorial policy is a deferential policy,
in which the victim has the ability to make the ultimate decision as to whether the abuser is
prosecuted at all. Id.
61
See id. at 188 (discussing the implications of non-coercive no-drop prosecutorial
policies). Without the victim’s testimony, prosecutors can proceed with outside evidence
including “[t]estimony of police officers, family members, and neighbors as to the state of
the defendant, victim, and the home; photographs of physical injuries and property
damage; medical records; audio tapes of emergency 911 calls; and excited utterances.” Id.;
see also Richard D. Friedman & Bridget McCormack, Dial-In Testimony, 150 U. PA. L. REV.
1171, 1174–75 (2002) (describing prosecutors’ use and courts’ acceptance of 911 calls and
follow-up conversations as evidence in a criminal domestic violence trial).
62
Drinski Interview, supra note 58. This practice has been successfully employed in
Newton County, Indiana and surrounding counties with counseling sessions conducted by
victims’ advocates from the North Central Indiana Rural Crisis Center. Id.; see also Han,
supra note 50, at 188–89 (discussing requirements imposed on domestic violence victims
seeking to withdraw their participation in the prosecution of their abusers). Not all
prosecutors are receptive to victim requests to dismiss cases. See Bell et al., supra note 57, at
78 (describing a victim’s experience in attempting to drop the charges against her abuser).
The victim said the prosecutor “was nasty, made fun of me, she humiliated me in front of
everyone.” Id.
63
Han, supra note 50, at 189. See generally Davis et al., supra note 54, at 7–9 (discussing
the benefits and problems associated with no-drop prosecution of domestic violence). In a
study of the results of no-drop prosecution policies, a large increase in guilty pleas and a
significant decrease in dismissals followed implementation of the policy. Id. at 7.
Researchers note that the success of the no-drop policy in the studied jurisdictions may not
have been possible without the additional funding needed to provide training for police
officers, judges, specialized officers who worked with prosecutors to conduct follow up
investigations, and advocates to work with victims to ensure cooperation in prosecuting
the abuser. Id. at 10. Another noteworthy result of the no-drop policy in the studied
jurisdictions is an increase in pretrial diversion dispositions, which were virtually unheard
of prior to the no-drop policy, but accounted for more than one in five dispositions
following implementation. Id.
64
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE FACTS, supra note 7, at 2.
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perpetrator and the victim must be current or former spouses, live
together, or have at least one child in common.65 Many states also
include current or former dating relationships as qualifying relationships
for domestic violence offenses.66 This is important because the abuser
meeting the state’s definition of domestic violence serves as a predicate
for other relevant state and federal statutes.67
Once a domestic batterer has been arrested and charged with a
crime, he has three basic options.68 One option is to accept a plea
agreement offered by the prosecutor.69 In this scenario, the batterer
would plead guilty to some offense, often a lesser charge, and is likely to
receive a reduced sentence compared to what a defendant would
typically receive if convicted at trial.70 The second option is to take the

65
Id. In some states, such as Missouri, a charge of domestic violence requires that the
prosecutor prove the relationship between the defendant and victim as an additional
element of the crime. Swingle et al., supra note 45, at 221 (citing MO. REV. STAT. §§ 565.072–
74).
66
See DOMESTIC VIOLENCE FACTS, supra note 7, at 2 (discussing the relationships that can
meet statutory definitions of domestic violence).
67
See CRIMINAL RESOURCE MANUAL 1117, RESTRICTIONS ON THE POSSESSION OF FIREARMS
BY INDIVIDUALS CONVICTED OF A MISDEMEANOR CRIME OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE (July 2013),
http://www.justice.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/usam/title9/crm01117.htm,
archived at http://perma.cc/ZUL6-CDB5 [hereinafter CRIMINAL RESOURCE MANUAL 1117]
(providing instructions to U.S. Attorneys’ Offices regarding the application and
enforcement of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9) (“The Lautenberg Amendment”)). The Criminal
Resource Manual reads:
As enacted the statute defines “misdemeanor crime of domestic
violence” (MCDV) as any state or federal misdemeanor that – ‘has, as
an element, the use or attempted use of physical force, or the
threatened use of a deadly weapon, committed by a current or former
spouse, parent, or guardian of the victim, by a person with whom the
victim shares a child in common, by a person who is cohabiting with
or has cohabited with the victim as a spouse, parent, or guardian, or by
a person similarly situated to a spouse, parent, or guardian of the
victim.’
Id.
68
See Swingle et al., supra note 45, at 223 (detailing potential options for the defense of
domestic battery prosecutions and the associated ethical considerations).
69
See id. at 226 (explaining that plea agreements achieve justice while sparing the victim
from incurring further trauma by testifying about the abuse).
70
See Jonathan Schmidt & Laurel Beeler, State and Federal Prosecutions of Domestic
Violence, 11 FED. SENT. R. 159, 160 (1998) (discussing the use of plea agreements in the
resolution of misdemeanor domestic violence offenses without significant injury);
Interview with Lake County, Indiana Court Referee Jeff Boling, November 7, 2013
[hereinafter Boling Interview] (explaining that while a plea agreement is initially offered by
a prosecutor, it is also subject to approval by a judge, who may reject an agreement with
which he does not agree).
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case to trial, usually in front of a jury.71 This scenario is more costly, in
terms of both financial and judicial resources.72 It likely also requires the
victim, and any other individuals who witnessed the violence, to testify
against the batterer, although some prosecutors are focusing on
evidence-based prosecutions in which a case can proceed even without a
victim present in court to testify.73 A third, and increasingly popular
option, is to enter into a pretrial diversion.74
C. Definition of Pretrial Diversion
The specific terms of diversions can vary widely.
In some
jurisdictions, diversions require an admission of guilt.75 Most involve a
term of probation and can include such additional terms as restraining
orders forbidding contact with the victim of the domestic assault or
participation in a batterer’s intervention program or anger management
counseling.76 For purposes of this Note, a discussion of diversion will
focus on those arrangements that “suspend[] criminal justice case
processing of a domestic violence related charge, with one or more of the
following results: no charges filed, charges dismissed, or charges
expunged.”77
See Davis et al., supra note 54, at 4 (discussing the necessity of trial in some domestic
violence cases).
72
See id. at 10 (discussing the cost of domestic violence prosecutions). In a study of two
jurisdictions in which no-drop prosecution policies had been implemented, researchers
found that the proportion of cases proceeding to trial increased tenfold. Id. at 9. In one
jurisdiction, researchers estimated that each misdemeanor domestic violence prosecution
averaged a cost of $1000 in federal funds alone, in addition to local contributions. Id. at 10.
73
See Durham, supra note 46, at 652 (considering the roles of victims and witnesses in
testifying at domestic violence trials); Davis et al., supra note 54, at 9 (discussing the success
of two jurisdictions whose no-drop, or evidence-based, prosecution policies resulted in an
increased conviction rate in domestic violence cases).
74
See generally Reynolds, supra note 47, at 415 (evaluating the use of pretrial diversion
agreements in domestic violence prosecutions).
75
Jane Sadusky, Prosecution Diversion in Domestic Violence: Issues and Context, THE
BATTERED WOMEN’S JUSTICE PROJECT 2 (July 2003). This type of diversion is referred to as a
post-plea program. CATHERINE CAMILLETTI, BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, PRETRIAL
DIVERSION PROGRAMS RESEARCH SUMMARY 2–3 (Oct. 25, 2010), available at
https://www.bja.gov/Publications/PretrialDiversionResearchSummary.pdf, archived at
http://perma.cc/VB3Z-UBNN. In a post-plea diversion, an offender must plead guilty to
the crime with which he has been charged and participate in court ordered programs. Id. at
2. Once the offender completes the terms of the diversion, the charges and plea are thrown
out or dismissed. Id. at 2–3.
76
See Sadusky, supra note 75, at 2 (discussing the terms commonly included in diversion
agreements for domestic violence crimes). The three types of diversion programs that do
not require an admission of guilt are statewide pretrial diversion programs, prebooking
diversion programs, and postbooking diversion programs. CAMILLETTI, supra note 75, at 2.
77
See Sadusky supra note 75, at 2 (listing characteristics of typical diversion programs).
71
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The specific terms of pretrial diversions are usually determined by
the prosecutor, who has wide discretion, and may also be influenced by
the judge who will hear the case.78 Terms of these diversions can vary
widely between states and even between county or municipal
jurisdictions within the same state.79 Diversion agreements may require
participation in some type of counseling program such as anger
management, marital therapy programs, batterer intervention programs,
or substance abuse treatment, beyond the diversion requirements
contained in state statutes.80
In addition to variations in the terms of pretrial diversions, the
outcome that flows from them can vary greatly as well. For instance, the
completion of a diversion program in some jurisdictions results in a
78
See Interview with Newton County Superior Court Judge Daniel Molter, December 27,
2013 [hereinafter Molter Interview] (discussing pretrial diversion as it is typically applied
in Newton County, Indiana); Reynolds, supra note 47, at 430 (discussing the role of the
prosecutor in determining which cases should be diverted). Reynolds also suggests that
specific eligibility requirements should be implemented to guide prosecutors’ discretion in
offering pretrial diversions to “avoid[] the danger of the program becoming a dumping
ground for case overload, and maintain[ing] consistency in the types of defendants
admitted.” Id.
79
See, e.g., IND. CODE § 33-39-1-8 (2008) (providing the terms under which a prosecutor
may withhold prosecution). Indiana’s statute provides that a pretrial diversion agreement
may include conditions that the person:
(1) pay to the clerk of the court an initial user’s fee and monthly user’s
fee in the amounts specified in IC 33-37-4-1;
(2) work faithfully at suitable employment or faithfully pursue a
course of study or career and technical education that will equip the
person for suitable employment;
(3) undergo available medical treatment or counseling and remain in a
specified facility required for that purpose;
(4) support the person’s dependents and meet other family
responsibilities;
(5) make restitution or reparation to the victim of the crime for the
damage or injury that was sustained;
(6) refrain from harassing, intimidating, threatening, or having any
direct or indirect contact with the victim or a witness;
(7) report to the prosecuting attorney at reasonable times;
(8) answer all reasonable inquiries by the prosecuting attorney and
promptly notify the prosecuting attorney of any change in address or
employment; and
(9) participate in dispute resolution either under IC 34-57-3 or a
program established by the prosecuting attorney.
Id. The statute also provides that a pretrial diversion agreement “may include other
provisions reasonably related to the defendant’s rehabilitation, if approved by the court.”
Id.
80
See David Adams, Treatment Programs for Batterers, 5 CLINICS FAM. PRAC. 159, 162 (Mar.
2003) (providing examples of the wide range of minimum program durations in various
states); CAMILLETTI, supra note 75, at 2 (discussing the conditions that are commonly
imposed on defendants in diversion programs).
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lesser conviction, while in others the result is a complete dismissal of all
criminal charges stemming from the incident, and can also include
expunging the record of the arrest.81 The diversion standards developed
by the National Association of Pretrial Services Agencies (“NAPSA”)
state that enrollment in a pretrial diversion program should not be
conditioned on a formal plea of guilty.82 Despite this, diversions are
commonly used by most jurisdictions in a variety of case types because
of their benefits.
D. Uses of Pretrial Diversion
Pretrial diversion programs have a wide variety of beneficial
applications.83 They may be used to resolve misdemeanor cases in
specialized settings such as drug courts.84 Traffic violations that are
more severe than simple infractions are also commonly disposed of
through diversion programs.85 Diversions are also used in standard
court settings for certain offenses, although some jurisdictions limit their
use to criminal prosecutions involving nonviolent offenses.86

Sadusky, supra note 75, at 6; see Melissa Hooper, Note, When Domestic Violence
Diversion Is No Longer an Option: What to Do with the Female Offender, 11 BERKELEY WOMEN’S
L.J. 168, 170 (1996) (providing that once a case was diverted under California law, the
defendant’s record would be expunged).
82
See NAT’L ASSOC. OF PRETRIAL SERVICES AGENCIES, PERFORMANCE STANDARDS AND
GOALS FOR PRETRIAL DIVERSION/INTERVENTION viii (Nov. 2008), http://www.napsa.org/
publications/diversion_intervention_standards_2008.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/
F8K-UAUB (establishing standards to be implemented in pretrial diversion programs).
83
See C. Quince Hopkins, Tempering Idealism with Realism: Using Restorative Justice
Processes to Promote Acceptance of Responsibility in Cases of Intimate Partner Violence, 35 HARV.
J.L. & GENDER 311, 345 (2012) (listing petty drug offenses, juvenile offenses, and family
violence offenses as typical situations in which the use of pretrial diversion programs can
be beneficial).
84
See id. at 347–48 (considering pretrial diversion programs in the context of minor drug
offenses); CAMILLETTI, supra note 75, at 2–3 (discussing the types of pretrial diversions
designed to assist different types of offenders). Diversion programs attempt to help
offenders suffering from mental illnesses, drug or alcohol abuse, or co-occurring disorders
by diverting them from the criminal justice system into treatment programs. Id. at 3.
85
See Infraction Diversion Program, MONROE CNTY. PROSECUTOR, http://www.monroe
prosecutor.us/criminal-justice/traffic-court-infraction-diversion-program/programeligibility (last visited Sept. 1, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/F4TF-B9LG (detailing the
infraction diversion program available for specific traffic offenses). Speeding and
operating a vehicle with a suspended driver’s license are typical examples of such
violations. Id.
86
See CAMILLETTI, supra note 75, at 1 (providing the New York City diversion program
as an example, which is limited to first-time offenders with nonviolent misdemeanor
offenses and inadequate employment); Reynolds, supra note 47, at 425–26 (discussing
Ohio’s statute which prohibits the use of the diversion process for repeat offenders or those
accused of a violent offense).
81
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Additionally, some state statutes restrict the use of pretrial diversions to
only those offenders with no prior criminal history.87
In many areas, diversions are the primary method of resolving
One attorney’s description of her
domestic violence crimes.88
community’s approach highlights the prevalence of pretrial diversion as
a catch-all for such cases:
Most first time offenders are given the option of the
[pretrial diversion] which gives the offender an
opportunity to successfully complete a period of
probation, after which the case is dismissed. There are
no criteria or guidelines for eligibility. Many
practitioners, including probation officers, gave
examples of seeing a wide range of defendants (e.g., a
push and shove case to a case where a man put bruises
all over his wife’s body) receive the same sentence.89
A similar situation was found in California, where diversion began “as a
way of managing cases that were not considered too serious, [but]
became a dumping ground for cases in which prosecutors did not
believe they could get convictions, even where the violence was
severe.”90 Moreover, in states such as New Jersey, cases are often
downgraded or dismissed entirely when victims do not wish to pursue
charges.91 This means that the diversion-type arrangement granted to
Baltimore Raven football player Ray Rice in 2014 is actually a more
severe outcome than a typical batterer would normally receive in New
Jersey.92
Reynolds, supra note 47, at 425–26; see CAMILLETTI, supra note 75, at 1 (listing eligibility
conditions that may apply for common diversion programs, including prior criminal
history, current charge, substance abuse history, mental health history, victim approval,
restitution repayment, and arresting officer approval).
88
See Hopkins, supra note 83, at 351–52 (evaluating the use of pretrial diversion
programs in Arizona and Virginia).
89
See Sadusky, supra note 75, at 7 (quoting a Mar. 25, 2003 telephone interview with
Rhonda Martinson, J.D., of the Battered Women’s Justice Project).
90
Hooper, supra note 81, at 170. Counties were diverting offenders who were not
eligible for the program as a means of clearing the court’s calendar, and offenders were not
monitored while participating in the diversion program. Id.
91
Program that Accepted Ray Rice Rare in Domestic Cases, USA TODAY (Sept. 16, 2014),
http://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/nfl/2014/09/16/program-that-accepted-ricerare-in-domestic-cases/15704943/, archived at http://perma.cc/PH9C-C9GQ.
92
See Scott Brown & Jamison Hensley, Ray Rice OK’d for Diversion Program, ESPN (May
21,
2014),
http://espn.go.com/nfl/story/_/id/10960822/ray-rice-baltimore-ravensaccepted-pretrial-diversion-program, archived at http://perma.cc/TMV3-GMCJ (explaining
that the pretrial intervention program is a diversion program that permits certain
87
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The existence of pretrial diversion programs is typically authorized
by state statute and may be limited to specific types of offenses.93
However, some states, such as Utah, North Dakota, and Ohio, do not
permit diversions in domestic violence cases.94 Further, Utah’s statute
includes a provision that permits an uncooperative victim to be treated
as an unavailable witness under the state’s Rules of Evidence.95
California eliminated its pretrial diversion program for domestic
violence cases in 1996 under Chapter 641, instead requiring that
prosecutors bring every domestic violence charge to trial and the

defendants to avoid formal prosecution); Program that Accepted Ray Rice Rare in Domestic
Cases, supra note 91 (suggesting that Rice’s case “appears to have been handled more
harshly, in fact, because of his fame.”). Rice was admitted into the pretrial intervention
program after punching his then-fiancée in the face and knocking her unconscious in a
hotel elevator. Id. Under the terms of the program, Rice agreed to receive anger
management counseling and pay $125 in fines. Id. This agreement was made available to
Rice after his case was taken over by county prosecutors and moved from a lower-level
municipal court. Id. According to ESPN:
Of the 15,029 people charged with assault in domestic violence cases
from 2010 to 2013, [8203] had their cases dismissed or downgraded to a
lower court, according to the data provided by the state judiciary.
Nearly [3100] pleaded guilty, [thirteen] were found guilty at trial and
nine were found not guilty.
Id.
93
See IND. CODE § 33-39-1-8 (2008) (authorizing pretrial diversion programs for most
misdemeanor offenses, Level 6 felonies, and Level 5 felonies, excluding the following:
commercial driver’s license holders charged with an offense involving the operation of a
motor vehicle in accordance with the federal Motor Carrier Safety Improvement Act of
1999, or a person arrested for or charged with operating a vehicle while intoxicated). The
statute also prohibits pretrial diversions for individuals under age eighteen who hold
probationary driver’s licenses and are charged with illegal possession, consumption, or
transportation of alcohol by a minor; operation of a motor vehicle following suspension of
certificate of registration, or in violation of restricted driving privileges; criminal
recklessness involving a vehicle; obstruction of traffic using a motor vehicle; or criminal
mischief while the defendant was operating a motor vehicle. Id. The Indiana statute
contains no exclusion for domestic violence crimes. Id.
94
See N.D. CENT. CODE § 29-01-16 (2013) (providing that an offense may be
compromised except “[i]f the offense involves a crime of domestic violence as defined in
section 14-07.1-01 or is a violation of section 12.1-20-05, 12.1-20-07, 12.1-20-12.1, or 12.1-2012.2”); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2935.36 (2006) (providing for pretrial diversion programs,
but excluding “[p]ersons accused of an offense of violence”); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
2901.01 (defining “[o]ffense of violence” to include domestic violence under § 2919.25);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-36-2.7(6) (LexisNexis 2014) (providing that “[t]he court may not
approve diversion for a perpetrator of domestic violence”).
95
See UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-36-2.7(5) (“When the privilege of confidential
communication between spouses, or the testimonial privilege of spouses is invoked in any
criminal proceeding in which a spouse is the victim of an alleged domestic violence
offense, the victim shall be considered to be an unavailable witness under the Utah Rules of
Evidence.”).
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defendant must enter a plea in response to the charges.96 The National
Council of Juvenile and Family Court Judges published a model state
code for cases involving family violence, which prohibits diversions for
such crimes.97 Instead, the model code provides that the court may defer
sentencing of a perpetrator who meets specific eligibility criteria if
several conditions are satisfied, including a hearing in which the
perpetrator enters a plea of guilty or a judicial admission to the crime.98
When a prosecutor or judge weighs the possibility of a pretrial diversion
agreement in a domestic violence case, a number of factors should be
considered.
E. Factors in Domestic Violence Prosecutions
In a criminal case involving domestic violence, a judge or prosecutor
should be aware of the implications that the disposition will have on the
96
See Hooper, supra note 81, at 171 (discussing the changes in domestic violence
prosecutions brought about by Chapter 641). Chapter 641 amends Penal Code § 1203.097.
Id. California’s terms of probation for domestic violence crimes now requires an offender
complete a minimum of thirty-six months of probation, be subject to a criminal court
protective order protecting the victim from further violence, a minimum fee of $500,
successful completion of a batterer’s intervention program, and community service. CAL.
PENAL CODE § 1203.097 (West 2014).
Conditions of probation may also include
requirements that the batterer make payments to a battered women’s shelter of up to $5000
and reimburse the victim for reasonable expenses resulting from the offense. Id. If it
appears that the defendant is not performing satisfactorily in the program, a hearing can be
held at the request of the probation officer, prosecuting attorney, or the court’s own
motion, to determine whether further sentencing should proceed. Id. Factors to be
considered in such a hearing include violence by the defendant against the previous or a
new victim, and noncompliance with any other condition of the probation. Id.
97
NAT’L COUNCIL OF JUVENILE AND FAMILY COURT JUDGES, FAMILY VIOLENCE: A MODEL
STATE CODE (1994), available at http://www.ncjfcj.org/sites/default/files/modecode_
fin_printable.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/JHP4-JVYD. The National Council of
Juvenile and Family Court Judges writes:
The Model Code was developed with the collegial and expert
assistance of an advisory committee composed of leaders in the
domestic violence field including judges, prosecutors, defense
attorneys, matrimonial lawyers, battered women’s advocates, medical
and health care professionals, law enforcement personnel, legislators,
educators and others. . . . [The Code] treats domestic and family
violence as a crime which requires early, aggressive and thorough
intervention.
Id. at v–vi.
98
See id. at 15–16 (“Criteria adopted in many jurisdictions address the history and
pattern of the perpetrator’s violence, the severity of injuries to the victim, the criminal
history of the defendant, the nature of the presenting crime (misdemeanor or felony), and
prior diversion or participation in deferred sentencing.”); Molter Interview, supra note 78
(suggesting that a court should consider the specific details of an arrest, rather than blindly
granting diversion agreements).
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offender in other areas of the law. Part II.E.1 defines the Lautenberg
Amendment and details how it and similar state legislation can apply in
domestic violence situations.99 Part II.E.2 highlights the statutory
penalty enhancements for repeat domestic violence offenses in selected
states.100 Part II.E.3 evaluates social factors that should be weighed when
determining the appropriate course in the prosecution of a domestic
violence offense.101
1.

The Lautenberg Amendment

In addition to the requirements imposed on police officers and
prosecutors at the state level, the federal government enacted gun
control laws to prohibit gun possession by individuals who had been
convicted of felony domestic violence crimes.102 Unfortunately, these
laws did not originally apply to many batterers because domestic
violence crimes in most states are misdemeanors.103 In response to this
99
See infra Part II.E.1 (explaining the intent and implications of the Lautenberg
Amendment on individuals convicted of domestic violence crimes).
100
See infra Part II.E.2 (discussing state statutes providing increased penalties for repeat
domestic violence offenses).
101
See infra Part II.E.3 (considering the societal implications of various approaches to
domestic violence prosecutions).
102
See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8) (2012) (providing a federal statute forbidding convicted
abusers from owning guns). The statute provides:
(g) It shall be unlawful for any person—
(8) who is subject to a court order that—
(A) was issued after a hearing of which such person
received actual notice, and at which such person had an
opportunity to participate;
(B) restrains such person from harassing, stalking, or
threatening an intimate partner of such person or child of
such intimate partner or person, or engaging in other
conduct that would place an intimate partner in reasonable
fear of bodily injury to the partner or child; and
(C) (i) includes a finding that such person represents a
credible threat to the physical safety of such intimate
partner or child; or
(ii) by its terms explicitly prohibits the use, attempted
use, or threatened use of physical force against such
intimate partner or child that would reasonably be
expected to cause bodily injury . . .
to ship or transport in interstate or foreign commerce, or possess in or
affecting commerce, any firearm or ammunition; or to receive any
firearm or ammunition which has been shipped or transported in
interstate or foreign commerce.
Id.
103
See Robert A. Mikos, Enforcing State Law in Congress’s Shadow, 90 CORNELL L. REV.
1411, 1457 (2005) (explaining the failure of previous gun control legislation to reach the
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problem, Congress passed the Lautenberg Amendment in 1996.104 This
legislation went further than existing federal gun regulations, making it
a crime for a person with a misdemeanor domestic violence conviction to
possess a gun.105 Since its enactment, the Lautenberg Amendment has
been heavily criticized for its broad application and lack of exceptions.106
majority of domestic abusers because the regulations applied only to convicted felons); see
also 142 Cong. Rec. H10,434-01 (daily ed. Sept. 17, 1996) (statement of Rep. Schroeder)
(elaborating on the discrepancies between the laws). Representative Schroeder explains:
Our biggest problem is many States have not lifted domestic violence
convictions to the level of a felony.
They consider them a
misdemeanor. Other States have allowed people, even though it is
considered a felony, to plead guilty to a lesser crime. Therefore, when
they do the checks for whether or not you should be able to buy the
gun, an awful lot of people who have been convicted of domestic
violence problems are able to escape.
Id.
104
18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9). See 142 Cong. Rec. S10,378 (daily ed. Sept. 12, 1996) (statement of
Sen. Wellstone) (offering hypothetical situations to illustrate the problem with the current
law). Senator Wellstone cautions:
In all too many cases, unfortunately, if you beat up or batter your
neighbor’s wife, it is a felony. If you beat up or batter, brutalize your
own wife or your own child, it is a misdemeanor. If the offense is a
misdemeanor, then under the current law there is a huge loophole.
We do not let people who have been convicted of a felony purchase
that firearm. What the Senator from New Jersey is trying to do is plug
this loophole and prohibit someone convicted of domestic abuse,
whether felony or misdemeanor, of purchasing a firearm. For
example, in my State of Minnesota, an act of domestic violence is not
characterized as a felony unless there is permanent physical
impairment, the use of a weapon, or broken bones.
Id.
105
18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9).
(g) It shall be unlawful for any person—
(9) who has been convicted in any court of a misdemeanor
crime of domestic violence, to ship or transport in interstate or
foreign commerce, or possess in or affecting commerce, any
firearm or ammunition; or to receive any firearm or ammunition
which has been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign
commerce.
Id.
106
See generally Alison J. Nathan, Note, At the Intersection of Domestic Violence and Guns:
The Public Interest Exception and the Lautenberg Amendment, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 822, 827
(2000) (discussing the lack of a public interest exception to exclude police officers and
military members from the law’s application); see also CRIMINAL RESOURCE MANUAL 1117,
supra note 67 (discussing the absence of an exception for police and military members in
the Lautenberg Amendment). The Criminal Resource Manual elaborates:
Thus, as of the effective date, any member of the military or any police
officer who has a qualifying misdemeanor conviction is no longer able
to possess a firearm, even while on duty. We now have the anomalous
situation that 18 U.S.C. § 925(a)(1) still exempts felony convictions for
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Proponents of the Lautenberg Amendment point to the strong
correlation between domestic violence and gun violence.107 A 2001 study
on homicide among intimate partners conducted by the Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention revealed that female intimate partners
are more likely to be murdered with a firearm than by all other means
combined.108
The Lautenberg Amendment seeks to protect victims of domestic
violence by prohibiting all abusers from owning firearms.109 The

these two groups. Thus if a police officer is convicted of murdering
his/her spouse or has a protection order placed against them, they
may, under federal law, still be able to possess a service revolver while
on duty, whereas if they are convicted of a qualifying misdemeanor
they are prohibited from possessing any firearm or ammunition at any
time. Currently pending before Congress are at least two bills that
would substantially modify the impact of the amendment to this
section.
Id.; U.S. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, Intimate Partner Violence, NATIONAL CENTER FOR PTSD,
http://www.ptsd.va.gov/public/types/violence/domestic-violence.asp (last visited June
29, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/6C3N-UK4V (citing statistics pertaining to rates of
intimate partner violence among Veterans and active duty service members).
107
See CRIMINAL RESOURCE MANUAL 1117, supra note 67 (describing the impact of the
Lautenberg Amendment on law enforcement). The Criminal Resource Manual explains:
This new provision affects law enforcement in three interrelated ways.
First, it will assist in preventing those individuals who have
demonstrated a propensity for domestic violence from obtaining a
firearm. Second, it will assist law enforcement by providing a tool for
the removal of firearms from certain explosive domestic situations thus
decreasing the possibility of deadly violence. Finally, it will serve as a
federal prosecution tool in certain situations where alternatives have
failed.
Id. On average, more than three women per day are killed by an intimate partner, and
guns are a significant factor in the level of lethality. NNEDV Encourages Senate to Protect
Victims from Gun Violence, NAT’L NETWORK TO END DOMESTIC VIOLENCE (Apr. 17, 2013),
http://www.nnedv.org/news/national/3670-toomey-manchin-amendment-2013.html,
archived at http://perma.cc/RCM8-AH8A [hereinafter NNEDV Encourages] (analyzing the
correlation between murder rates and a domestic abuser’s access to a gun).
108
SARAH HENRY, BATTERED WOMEN’S JUSTICE PROJECT NAT’L CTR. ON PROTECTION
ORDERS AND FULL FAITH & CREDIT, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND THE MILITARY (Apr. 24, 2013),
available at https://bwjp.ilinc.com/perl/ilinc/lms/async_launch.pl?pvr_id=fpfppyr&
session_id=32246807&activity_id=jxspjck&user_id=kyvbsbym&type=recording, archived at
http://perma.cc/7WC6-4KE6 (emphasizing the importance of reducing access to firearms
in houses affected by intimate partner violence).
109
See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9) (discussing the requirements and effects of the Lautenberg
Amendment); see also HENRY, supra note 108 (discussing the difficulty associated with the
enforcement of the Lautenberg Amendment); MARY MALEFYT SEIGHMAN & DAVID R.
THOMAS, NAT’L CTR. ON FULL FAITH AND CREDIT, MODEL LAW ENFORCEMENT POLICY:
SERVING AND ENFORCING PROTECTION ORDERS & SEIZING FIREARMS IN DOMESTIC VIOLENCE
CASES 19 (Oct. 2005), available at http://www.fullfaithandcredit.org/files/bwjp/
files/ModelLEPolicyFINAL.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/5SDD-NBMP (providing
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rationale for the law is apparent from the comments of the sponsor of the
Amendment, Senator Frank Lautenberg, who referred to the provision as
“nothing short of a matter of life and death.”110 Senator Lautenberg went
on to testify that “in households with a history of battering, the presence
of a gun increases the likelihood that a woman will be killed
threefold . . . all too often, the difference between a battered woman and
a dead woman is the presence of a gun.”111 The statute provides that:
[i]t shall be unlawful for any person . . . who has been
convicted in any court of a misdemeanor crime of
domestic violence, to ship or transport in interstate or
foreign commerce, or possess in or affecting commerce,
any firearm or ammunition; or to receive any firearm or
ammunition which has been shipped or transported in
interstate or foreign commerce.112
Under this Amendment, batterers who own guns are to surrender them
upon entry of a domestic violence conviction.113 Individuals who violate
this law can receive a fine and a sentence of up to ten years in prison.114
Some form of gun control aimed at domestic abusers exists in most
states, although the specifics of those laws vary widely, with some states
prohibiting all gun ownership by an individual convicted of domestic
violence, while others only restrict firearms actually used in the
commission of a domestic violence offense.115 A statute prohibiting gun
model policies and standard operating procedures intended for use by law enforcement
agencies involved in domestic violence cases).
110
142 Cong. Rec. S11,226 (daily ed. Sept. 25, 1996) (statement of Sen. Lautenberg).
111
Id.; see GEORGIA COALITION AGAINST DOMESTIC VIOLENCE & GEORGIA COMM’N ON
FAMILY VIOLENCE, FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FROM THE GEORGIA DOMESTIC
VIOLENCE FATALITY REVIEW PROJECT 12 (Dec. 2004), available at http://gcadv.org/wpcontent/uploads/2011/01/Fatality-Review-Annual-Report-2004.pdf,
archived
at
http://perma.cc/9T5W-KF9G [hereinafter GEORGIA COALITION] (acknowledging that
homicide can be committed without guns, but evaluating “the intersection of gun access
with significant events” and questioning “what if the offender did not possess such a lethal
weapon at the time of such an intense event in his life?”).
112
18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9).
113
See Sharon L. Gold, Note, Why Are Victims of Domestic Violence Still Dying at the Hands
of Their Abusers? Filling the Gap in State Domestic Violence Gun Laws, 91 KY. L.J. 935, 949
(2003) (discussing the challenges in enforcing the Lautenberg Amendment and similar state
laws).
114
18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(2).
115
See INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE AND FIREARMS FACT SHEET, supra note 10, at 3–4
(discussing the differences in state laws pertaining to firearms and domestic violence).
Some states have regulatory systems that far exceed federal law, some are only slightly
more restrictive than federal law, and others simply rely on the federal protections. Id. See,
e.g., IND. CODE § 35-47-4-7 (2014) (prohibiting possession of a firearm by a person convicted
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ownership by a person with a domestic violence conviction exists in
Indiana, but unlike the Lautenberg Amendment, the Indiana law
includes the terms upon which an individual can petition for restoration
of the right to possess a firearm, provided the petition is filed at least five
years after the date of conviction for a domestic violence offense.116
According to the Indiana statute, factors the court should consider when
deciding whether to restore an individual’s right to possess a firearm
include: whether the person has been subject to any variety of protective
order or another court order that prohibits the person from possessing a
firearm, completion of substance abuse programs or parenting classes,
whether the person still poses a threat to the victim of the domestic
abuse, and whether there is any other reason the person should not be
permitted to possess a firearm, including the commission of a
subsequent offense.117
2.

State Statutory Penalty Enhancements for Repeat Offenses

In addition to treating domestic violence crimes more seriously,
many state legislatures took a more aggressive approach to the problem
of repeat offenders. For example, in Indiana, the first time a person is
charged with a crime of domestic abuse, he may be charged with a Class
A Misdemeanor; however, if a person is charged with a crime of
domestic abuse and has a prior conviction for a similar offense, the
charge is elevated to a Class D Felony.118 In other states, such as Utah,
of domestic violence, but allowing the offender to petition the court for restoration of rights
beginning five years from the date of the conviction, provided the individual meets
specified criteria). But cf. ALASKA STAT. 18.66.100(C)(6)–(7) (2014) (providing that a
protective order may “prohibit the respondent from using or possessing a deadly weapon
if the court finds the respondent was in the actual possession of or used a weapon during
the commission of domestic violence” and may direct the respondent to surrender any
such firearm). See generally BATTERED WOMEN’S JUSTICE PROJECT NATIONAL CENTER ON
PROTECTION ORDERS AND FULL FAITH & CREDIT, FIREARMS AND DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: STATE
AND
TERRITORIAL
STATUTORY
PROVISIONS
(Nov.
2010),
available
at
http://www.fullfaithandcredit.org/files/bwjp/files/Firearms%20and%20Domestic%20Vi
olence%20State%20and%20Territorial%20Statutory%20Provisions%20Matrix%202010%20%
28Updated%2011-17-10%29.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/N7KK-W45F (listing and
explaining the firearms statutes for each state within three categories: (1) civil protection
orders, (2) criminal offenses, procedures, orders, and prohibited transferees, and (3)
licenses/permits, background checks, and miscellaneous provisions).
116
See, e.g., IND. CODE § 35-47-4-7 (providing that “a person who has been convicted of a
crime of domestic violence may not possess a firearm.”).
117
See id. (providing criteria to be considered by the court when ruling on a convicted
domestic batterer’s petition for reinstatement of the right to possess a firearm).
118
IND. CODE § 35-42-2-1.3. The statute provides:
(a) A person who knowingly or intentionally touches an individual
who:
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the underlying crime may be a lower level offense than in Indiana, but a
subsequent offense still carries an enhanced penalty.119 These statutory
(1) is or was a spouse of the other person;
(2) is or was living as if a spouse of the other person as
provided in subsection (c); or
(3) has a child in common with the other person;
in a rude, insolent, or angry manner that results in bodily injury to the
person described in subdivision (1), (2), or (3) commits domestic
battery, a Class A Misdemeanor.
(b) However, the offense under subsection (a) is a Level 6 felony if
the person who committed the offense:
(1) has a previous, unrelated conviction:
(A) under this section (or IC 35-42-2-1(a)(2)(E) before that
provision was removed by P.L. 188-1999, SECTION 5); or
(B) in any other jurisdiction, including a military court, in
which the elements of the crime for which the conviction
was entered are substantially similar to the elements
described in this section; or
(2) committed the offense in the physical presence of a child less
than sixteen (16) years of age, knowing that the child was present
and might be able to see or hear the offense.
Id.
See UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-36-1.1 (West 2014) (providing enhanced offenses and
penalties for subsequent domestic violence offenses).
(1) For purposes of this section, “qualifying domestic violence
offense” means:
(a) a domestic violence offense in Utah; or
(b) an offense in any other state, or in any district, possession, or
territory of the United States, that would be a domestic violence
offense under Utah law.
(2) A person who is convicted of a domestic violence offense is:
(a) guilty of a class B misdemeanor if:
(i) the domestic violence offense described in this
Subsection (2) is designated by law as a class C
misdemeanor; and
(ii) (A) the domestic violence offense described in this
Subsection (2) is committed within five years after the
person is convicted of a qualifying domestic violence
offense; or
(B) the person is convicted of the domestic violence
offense described in this Subsection (2) within five
years after the person is convicted of a qualifying
domestic violence offense;
(b) guilty of a class A misdemeanor if:
(i) the domestic violence offense described in this
Subsection (2) is designated by law as a class B
misdemeanor; and
(ii) (A) the domestic violence offense described in this
subsection (2) is committed within five years after the
person is convicted of a qualifying domestic violence
offense; or

119
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enhancements recognize that battering is rarely an isolated incident, and
that it tends to increase in both frequency and severity over time.120 In
addition to statutory concerns, domestic violence prosecutions also have
substantial societal implications.
3.

Societal Implications

Domestic abuse has substantial effects on society as a whole, from
those family members directly involved in abusive situations, to
extended family, friends, and even employers. Between 1996 and 2001,
the National Incident Based Reporting System received reports of
(B) the person is convicted of the domestic violence
offense described in this Subsection (2) within five
years after the person is convicted of a qualifying
domestic violence offense; or
(c) guilty of a felony of the third degree if:
(i) the domestic violence offense described in this
Subsection (2) is designated by law as a class A
misdemeanor; and
(ii) (A) the domestic violence offense described in this
Subsection (2) is committed within five years after the
person is convicted of a qualifying domestic violence
offense; or
(B) the person is convicted of the domestic violence
offense described in this Subsection (2) within five
years after the person is convicted of a qualifying
domestic violence offense.
(3) For purposes of this section, a plea of guilty or no contest to any
qualifying domestic violence offense in Utah which plea is held in
abeyance under Title 77, Chapter 2a, Pleas in Abeyance, is the
equivalent of a conviction, even if the charge has been subsequently
reduced or dismissed in accordance with the plea in abeyance
agreement.
Id.
See Elena Salzman, Note, The Quincy District Court Domestic Violence Prevention
Program: A Model Legal Framework for Domestic Violence Intervention, 74 B.U. L. REV. 329, 344
(1994) (discussing the approaches taken by judges in the Quincy Program to address repeat
offenses); LOIS A. VENTURA & GABRIELLE DAVIS, UNIV. OF TOLEDO URBAN AFFAIRS CTR.,
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: COURT CASE CONVICTION AND RECIDIVISM IN TOLEDO 3–11 (Oct.
2004),
available
at
http://uac.utoledo.edu/Publications/Davis-Ventura-domesticviolence.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/8PQB-YBLC (discussing a study of domestic
violence cases in the Toledo Municipal Court that revealed one-third of abusers were
arrested on a subsequent domestic violence charge within one year following disposition of
the original abuse charge). Of the 1982 cases studied, 67.6% were dismissed, while 23.8%
resulted in a conviction, and 8.6% were still pending after eighteen months. Id. at 3; see also
GEORGIA COALITION, supra note 111, at 12 (highlighting the significant findings of the
report). A review of Georgia domestic violence fatalities for the year 2003 revealed that in
more than 80% of the cases, the perpetrator had previously committed at least one act of
domestic violence. Id.
120
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1,551,143 incidents of family violence.121 The annual cost of direct health
care expenses associated with domestic violence is $4.1 billion.122 The
cost of domestic violence to American employers due to absences and
lost productivity is approximately $13 billion each year.123 Domestic
violence accounts for over $37 million per year in law enforcement, legal
services, medical and mental health treatment, and lost productivity.124
Perhaps the most disturbing statistics on domestic violence are those
pertaining to children. Approximately 15.5 million children annually are
exposed to domestic violence.125 Men who were exposed to such
violence as children are four times more likely to be domestic abusers as
adults.126 Eighty percent of men in prisons grew up in homes where
violence was present.127 Studies suggest that girls who witness domestic

FAMILY VIOLENCE—FACTS AND FIGURES, NAT’L CRIMINAL JUSTICE REFERENCE SERVS.,
available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/spotlight/family_violence/facts.html (last visited Mar.
5, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/TKX4-DQSZ (providing statistics from an FBI study
on violence among family members and intimate partners). Of the 1,551,143 incidents
reported, opposite-sex dating relationships between the parties were the most common
(29.6% of incidents), followed by marital relationships (24.4%). Id.
122
NAT’L CTR. FOR INJURY PREVENTION AND CONTROL, COSTS OF INTIMATE PARTNER
VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN IN THE UNITED STATES 30 (Mar. 2003), available at
http://www.cdc.gov/violenceprevention/pdf/IPVBook-a.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc
/VZT7-MCFP (detailing health care expenses associated with domestic violence and
categorizing those expenses according to the type of abuse inflicted). The total health care
cost per victimization was $816 per physical assault, $838 per rape, and $294 per stalking
incident. Id.
123
NAT’L NETWORK TO END DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND SEXUAL
ASSAULT FACT SHEET 1, available at http://nnedv.org/downloads/Policy/AD14/
AD14_DVSA_Factsheet.pdf (last visited Oct. 16, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/8VD8KF8W (providing statistics on the economic impact of domestic violence).
124
See Domestic Violence: Statistics & Facts, SAFE HORIZON, http://www.safehorizon.org/
page/domestic-violence-statistics--facts-52.html (last visited Sept. 6, 2014), archived at
http://perma.cc/UP2W-K6QQ (detailing various consequences of domestic violence).
125
Renee McDonald et al., Estimating the Number of American Children Living in Partner
Violent Families, 20 J. FAM. PSYCHOL. 137, 137 (2006) (providing statistics on the prevalence
of children residing in homes where domestic violence occurs). It is estimated that
approximately seven million children live in families in which severe domestic violence has
occurred within the previous year. Id.
126
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND SEXUAL ASSAULT FACT SHEET, supra note 123; see Domestic
Violence, supra note 26 (discussing the immediate and long-term consequences to children
who are frequently exposed to domestic violence in their homes). Witnessing abuse in the
home increases children’s risk of becoming society’s next generation of victims and abusers
by teaching them that violence is a normal way of life. Id. Research also suggests a
connection between a child’s exposure to domestic violence and the perpetration of other
types of violence, such as animal abuse, as an adult. Danielle K. Campbell, Note, Animal
Abusers Beware: Registry Laws in the Works to Curb Your Abuse, 48 VAL. U. L. REV. 271, 281
(2013).
127
See The Generational Cycle of Violence, CRISIS CONNECTION, http://www.crisis
connectioninc.org/justformen/generational_cycle_of_violence.htm (last visited Mar. 5,
121
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abuse as children are more likely to tolerate it as adults.128 However,
these damaging consequences to children can be reduced through
intervention by the legal system and domestic violence programs.129
III. ANALYSIS
One trend of the legal system’s intervention in domestic violence
situations has been the increased use of pretrial diversion programs to
resolve criminal abuse charges. Part III assesses the value of pretrial
diversion in the context of domestic violence cases. Part III.A explores
the benefits of pretrial diversions to the criminal justice system, the
abuser, and the victim.130 Part III.B evaluates the concerns associated
with the use of pretrial diversions in domestic violence situations.131
A. Benefits of Pretrial Diversion
Proponents of pretrial diversions tout the benefits these programs
offer to offenders, the criminal justice system, and even victims. The
benefit to offenders is clear—pretrial diversions allow an abuser to avoid
a criminal conviction without the expense and uncertainty of taking the
case to trial.132 Pretrial diversions are beneficial to the criminal justice
system for similar reasons—quite simply, diversions can be
implemented more quickly and less expensively than cases can be
prosecuted.133 Pretrial diversions are also an attractive alternative to a

2014), archived at http://perma.cc/82ZT-UZCJ (providing facts and statistics on the effects
of violence on families).
128
See Long-Term Effects of Domestic Violence, CLARK CNTY. PROSECUTING ATT’Y
http://www.clarkprosecutor.org/html/domviol/effects.htm (last visited Mar. 6, 2014),
archived at http://perma.cc/L6C5-PQJN (discussing the causes and long term effects of
domestic violence on women and children).
129
Id. See Ron Cooper, Note, Lack of State Accountability in Acts of Domestic Violence:
Understanding the Contrast Between the U.S. and International Approaches, 29 ARIZ. J. INT’L &
COMP. L. 657, 670 (2012) (discussing the impact on families and society of the criminal
justice system’s approach to disposing of domestic violence offenses).
130
See infra Part III.A (considering the potential benefits of pretrial diversion as a means
of resolving criminal cases involving domestic violence).
131
See infra Part III.B (analyzing the negative effects of pretrial diversion in domestic
violence cases).
132
See supra notes 75–77 and accompanying text (defining pretrial diversion); Molter
Interview, supra note 78 (explaining that defendants receiving pretrial diversions may
benefit from completing the terms included in the agreement, such as substance abuse
treatment or batterers intervention programs).
133
Reynolds, supra note 47, at 426; see CAMILLETTI, supra note 75, at 3 (discussing benefits
of pretrial diversion programs to the criminal justice system). These programs are efficient
in terms of time and cost, and have been shown to reduce overcrowding in prisons. Id.
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dismissal in cases involving victims who may be uncooperative for a
variety of reasons.134
Indeed, the perspective of the victim is often the most complicated in
a domestic violence situation. For these victims, pretrial diversions are a
juxtaposition of benefits and potentially dangerous consequences.
Frequently, a victim of domestic violence wants her abuse to stop and
wants to be taken seriously, but may not want her partner to be
sentenced to time in jail because she may simply want the abuser to get
help so that the parties can reconcile.135 Moreover, a victim may need
her abuser to maintain employment in order to provide financial support
to her and possibly her children.136 Pretrial diversions serve to further all
of those interests, and may prevent a victim from being called to testify
against her abuser.137 This may be important to a victim for a variety of
reasons, including fear of retaliation, privacy concerns, prior negative
experiences with the legal system, or a desire to preserve harmony for
her children.138 In contrast to these benefits, pretrial diversions also
involve significant consequences.
B. Consequences of Pretrial Diversion
Although pretrial diversions allow for the efficient disposition of
criminal cases, they are especially troublesome in domestic violence
situations. Regardless of the terms attached to such an agreement, the
end result of their use in most domestic violence cases is consistent and
problematic: the offender disposes of his abuse charges in a manner that
allows him to escape a domestic violence conviction on his criminal
134
CAMILLETTI, supra note 75, at 3; see Swingle et al., supra note 45, at 222 (discussing the
challenges prosecutors face in cases involving uncooperative victims). Victims in domestic
violence cases often become hostile witnesses for the prosecution. Id. “The clash between
prosecutors seeking to stop the cycle of violence and defense lawyers trying to use the
victim’s lack of cooperation to get a client off scot-free can involve a variety of complex
legal issues.” Id.
135
See Sadusky, supra note 75, at 7 (highlighting common reasons that domestic violence
victims may favor diversion over other dispositions).
136
Id.; see CAMILLETTI, supra note 75, at 3 (explaining that when offenders are diverted
from the traditional criminal justice system, they avoid criminal convictions and are better
able to obtain employment and become productive members of society); Swingle et al.,
supra note 45, at 226 (discussing the importance of pretrial diversion to victims whose
spouse would lose his job if he received a conviction for domestic violence).
137
See Sadusky, supra note 75, at 7 (stating that diversion may make a victim more
receptive to advocates and prosecutors, thus increasing opportunities for safety planning
and to receive information about legal options and community resources).
138
Id. In a study of battered women’s responses to court interventions, many victims
expressed that a helpful part of the court intervention was getting the abuse “on the
record” as well as to “create consequences” and “hold him accountable.” Bell et al., supra
note 57, at 77.
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record.139 The fact that diversions do not result in a conviction allows for
the circumvention of several state and federal laws.140 Part III.B.1
analyzes how this lack of conviction may allow a known abuser to
continue possessing a firearm despite alarming statistics concerning the
correlation between domestic abuse and gun violence.141 Part III.B.2
examines how a pretrial diversion enables an abuser to avoid statutory
enhancements for subsequent offenses.142 Part III.B.3 concludes by
exploring the myriad of social implications that arise when a batterer is
permitted to resolve criminal charges without being held accountable for
his actions.143 However, the most significant consequence of pretrial
diversions is that absent a conviction, laws such as the Lautenberg
Amendment that would otherwise prevent a domestic batterer from
owning a gun do not apply.144
1.

The Lautenberg Loophole

Without question, preventing domestic batterers from owning guns
is an appropriate and desirable goal.145 However, the legal loopholes
See CAMILLETTI, supra note 75, at 1 (listing shared characteristics of pretrial diversion
programs, including the fact that completion of the program results in the dismissal of
criminal charges); Sadusky, supra note 75, at 2 (explaining that if a perpetrator successfully
completes the sentencing conditions imposed by the court, the case may be dismissed);
Swingle et al., supra note 45, at 226 (“If the abuser successfully completes the probation
term, he ends up with no criminal record whatsoever.”).
140
See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8)–(9) (2012) (citing the federal gun control statute predicated on
a felony conviction for domestic violence and triggered by a misdemeanor felony
conviction for domestic violence); IND. CODE § 35-42-2-1.3 (2014) (citing the Indiana statute
elevating domestic battery from a Class A Misdemeanor to a Class D Felony where the
defendant has a prior conviction for a similar offense); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-36-1.1 (West
2014) (citing the Utah statute providing several levels of elevation for domestic violence
offenses where the defendant has a prior conviction for a “qualifying domestic violence
offense”).
141
See infra Part III.B.1 (analyzing the effect of pretrial diversions to circumvent federal
firearms regulations imposed upon domestic abusers).
142
See infra Part III.B.2 (evaluating the inapplicability of statutory enhancements for
repeat offenses when convictions are avoided through pretrial diversion).
143
See infra Part III.B.3 (discussing the social consequences of using pretrial diversions in
criminal prosecutions for domestic violence crimes).
144
See GEORGIA COALITION, supra note 111, at 39 (finding that when abusers receive a
diversion, they cannot be held accountable for their firearm possession). For this reason,
the Georgia Coalition Against Domestic Violence recommends judges consistently issue
orders for the removal of firearms from domestic abusers and that diversion should not
typically be granted in such cases. Id.; see also Mikos, supra note 103, at 1460 (explaining
that defendants can “skirt the Lautenberg ban” by agreeing to a disposition that does not
result in a conviction).
145
See Campbell et al., supra note 30, at 18–19 (suggesting that the legal prohibition
against gun ownership by those convicted of domestic violence is especially important to
enforce and judicial orders should include firearms search-and-seizure provisions).
139
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created by pretrial diversions make that goal impossible to
accomplish.146 Simply put, when a batterer receives a pretrial diversion,
the resulting lack of conviction means that the Lautenberg Amendment
and similar state legislation will not apply.147 Not only does the lack of a
conviction allow abusers to continue possessing the guns they have
previously obtained, this scenario imposes no restrictions on the ability
to purchase additional firearms in the future.148 Given the strong
correlation between domestic violence and gun violence, this
discrepancy is especially troublesome.149 An abuser’s access to a gun
drastically increases the risk of murder to the victim, compared to
situations in which there are no weapons.150 Abusers who possess guns
tend to inflict the most severe abuse upon victims.151 Statistics show that
women in the United States are eleven times more likely to be murdered
with guns than women in any other developed nation.152 Most startling
is the Analysis of Recent Mass Shootings conducted in 2014, which

146
See supra notes 139–42 and accompanying text (evaluating the effect of an absence of
guilty plea or conviction resulting from pretrial diversion on gun control laws).
147
See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8)–(9) (2012) (discussing the requirement of a conviction to
trigger the protections offered by firearm laws directed at felony domestic abusers and the
extension of federal gun regulations to abusers with felony domestic violence convictions).
148
See Mikos, supra note 103, at 1461 (considering the effects of pretrial diversions on
federal statutes). “Avoiding a conviction not only undermines the congressional aims
behind the firearms ban, it may dilute the state sanctions as well. When defendants are put
through pretrial diversion programs, for example, they may not be punished at all for their
actions – by either the state or Congress.” Id.
149
See HENRY, supra note 108 (discussing the connection between domestic abuse and
gun violence). The enforcement of the prohibition is another troubling aspect of domestic
violence related firearms restrictions. Id. Removal of firearms from a domestic abuser is a
problematic area because numerous federal, state, and local agencies are implicated in the
process. Id. Enforcement of federal laws should be conducted by federal agencies, but
state court judges typically enact the predicate orders and in many jurisdictions there may
be no mechanism for reporting misdemeanor domestic violence convictions. Id.; see also
SEIGHMAN & THOMAS, supra note 109, at 19 (listing the model policies and procedures for
law enforcement agencies involved in domestic violence cases). The model code
recommends that a law enforcement officer who has determined through a criminal
records search that an offender has a previous conviction for a misdemeanor crime of
domestic violence should seize the offender’s firearms as contraband. Id. However, the
model code fails to recommend any proactive means by which firearms could be
confiscated upon the entry of the conviction rather than after a violation of the Lautenberg
Amendment has occurred. Id.
150
See NNEDV Encourages, supra note 107 (analyzing the correlation between murder
rates and a domestic abuser’s access to a gun).
151
See id. (discussing the level of lethality posed to domestic violence victims by an
abuser’s ownership of firearms).
152
See id. (providing statistics on the prevalence of gun violence directed toward women
in the United States).
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found that more than half of mass shootings are acts of domestic
violence or family violence.153
The Lautenberg “loophole” is not only known within the legal field,
but is openly exploited by criminal defense attorneys who advertise their
success in obtaining diversion agreements for previous clients as a
means of preserving clients’ Second Amendment rights.154 Even worse,
tactics such as pretrial diversions are sometimes offered by prosecutors
for the specific purpose of circumventing the Lautenberg Amendment
for batterers whose occupation requires the possession of a firearm, such
as police officers, corrections officers, or members of the military.155 A
domestic batterer should not receive a special exemption from the
Lautenberg Amendment simply because he is a police officer or a
See EVERYTOWN FOR GUN SAFETY, ANALYSIS OF RECENT MASS SHOOTINGS 1 (July 2014),
available
at
http://3gbwir1ummda16xrhf4do9d21bsx.wpengine.netdna-cdn.com/wpcontent/uploads/2014/10/analysis-of-recent-mass-shootings.pdf,
archived
at
http://perma.cc/7AY-B6RA (defining “mass shooting” as “any incident where at least
four people were murdered with a gun”). “In at least [sixty-three] of the cases (57%), the
shooter killed a current or former spouse or intimate partner or other family member, and
in at least [twenty] incidents the shooter had a prior domestic violence charge.” Id. at 3.
154
See Case Results, LAW OFFICES OF SCOT SIKES, http://www.scotsikes.com/case-results/
(last visited Oct. 1, 2013), archived at http://perma.cc/HBU2-SE6C (advertising prior
representation of a military member with a rank of SSG/E-6 “charged with Battery
(Domestic Violence). Early and aggressive intervention led to pretrial diversion plan and
LAW
FIRM,
dismissal
of
all
charges.”);
Domestic
Violence,
ARNOLD
http://www.arnoldlawfirmllc.com/CM/FamilyLaw/Domestic-Violence.asp (last visited
Oct. 1, 2013), archived at http://perma.cc/CH87-7JNF (advertising the prior outcomes of
domestic violence cases). Arnold Law Firm advertises:
We have represented numerous persons who are in the military
stationed and living in the Jacksonville area who absolutely cannot be
convicted or even receive a withhold of adjudication for domestic
battery because of the Lautenberg Amendment to the Gun Control Act
that prohibits one to carry a firearm who has pled to any charge
related to a domestic battery.
Id.; see also Domestic Violence Pretrial Diversion (Batterer Intervention), ERIC M. MATHENY
LAW, http://www.ericmathenylaw.com/Criminal-Defense-Blog/2012/March/DomesticViolence-Pretrial-Diversion-Batterer-In.aspx (last visited Nov. 20, 2013), archived at
http://perma.cc/KJ3L-B4ZC (discussing the use of diversions in defending domestic
violence cases). Matheny states:
Sometimes you have to work hard to get diversion in a [domestic
violence] case. It is possible for the state to offer jail or prison one day
and then diversion the next. This takes work to expose weaknesses in
the state’s case as many [domestic violence] cases are he-said/shesaid. . . . When you go into diversion, you are maintaining your plea
of not guilty. You are simply agreeing to complete the conditions in
exchange for dismissal of your charges.
Id.
155
See Mikos, supra note 103, at 1461 (citing an example of a Florida State Attorney who
“acknowledged giving corrections officers accused of domestic violence preferential
treatment because of the firearms ban”).
153
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member of the military; on the contrary, the argument could be made
that because police officers and military service members have higher
than average incidences of post-traumatic stress disorder, enforcement of
the Lautenberg Amendment is even more critical in their situations.156 In
addition to firearm laws, pretrial diversions also provide a means for
abusers to skirt other state statutes, especially those aimed at repeat
offenders.
2.

It’s the First Time Every Time

Studies indicate that the recidivism rate for domestic violence is two
and one-half times the rate of violence between strangers.157 As such, it
is not surprising that many states, including Indiana, have statutory
provisions that elevate the severity of domestic violence crimes when the
offender has a prior conviction.158 However, because a diversion does
not result in the entry of a conviction against the offender, there can be
no enhanced penalty for future offenses under these statutes.159 In this
sense, a diversion gives an offender a “clean slate” and makes each
incident of violence the first offense.160 Even in jurisdictions without
statutory enhancements, prior convictions for domestic violence can
make the consequences more severe for repeat offenses.161 For example,
a prosecutor might take previous offenses into account when offering a
plea agreement to a defendant accused of a domestic violence crime.162
Additionally, a judge may consider prior convictions as aggravating
factors when imposing a criminal sentence or accepting a plea
156
See U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs, supra note 106 (citing statistics pertaining to
rates of post-traumatic stress disorder and intimate partner violence among Veterans and
active duty service members). “Estimates of [intimate partner violence] committed by
Veterans and active duty servicemen range between 13.5% and 58% and these rates have
been found to be up to three times higher than seen among civilians.” Id.
157
See Salzman, supra note 120, at 344 (providing statistics on rates of recidivism in
relationships involving domestic violence).
158
See, e.g., Ind. Code § 35-42-2-1.3 (2008 & Supp. 2012) (providing for an enhanced
penalty in repeat domestic violence offenses).
159
Id; see GEORGIA COALITION, supra note 111, at 46 (finding that diverted cases result in
the inability of future prosecutors to file enhanced felonies based on prior cases). For this
reason, the Georgia Coalition Against Domestic Violence recommends that domestic
violence cases in which there is strong evidence of a crime should never be diverted. Id.
160
GEORGIA COALITION, supra note 111, at 46; see supra notes 81, 139 and accompanying
text (explaining that pretrial diversions do not result in a conviction entered against the
offender and in some instances lead to an expungement of the arrest record); SACK, supra
note 26, at 23 (recognizing that by definition, domestic violence is a pattern of repeated
abuse and that completion of a batterer’s intervention program does not ensure “recovery”
of an abuser that justifies dismissal of the conviction).
161
Drinski Interview, supra note 58.
162
Id.
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agreement.163 By avoiding convictions, pretrial diversions circumvent
statutory elevation of criminal charges as well as discretionary sentence
enhancements.164 Beyond the statutory implications, pretrial diversions
carry significant social consequences.
3.

Social Consequences of Avoiding Accountability

Arguably as important as the statutory concerns surrounding
pretrial diversions are social consequences. Most significantly, a
diversion does not require the offender to accept accountability for his
actions.165 Jane Sadusky of the Battered Women’s Justice Project
suggests that “[w]here offenders are not required to plead guilty in order
to participate in the diversion program, they can easily deny
accountability for their conduct and further minimize coercive and
violent behavior.”166 Statistics show that a batterer’s acceptance of
responsibility is critical to preventing recidivism and reducing overall
This acceptance can also be
incidents of domestic violence.167
instrumental in aiding the victim’s recovery.168 Some scholars suggest
that when a batterer is not required to accept responsibility for his
violent acts, he is likely to minimize the abuse he inflicts, blame the
163
Id.; see SACK, supra note 26, at 23 (stating that the information contained in a batterer’s
criminal history is important to a judge hearing a domestic violence case). When
diversions result in the dismissal of the domestic violence conviction, the case history is
erased and is not available to the court in future domestic violence cases involving the
same offender. Id.
164
See id. at 22 (suggesting that judges should consider whether a diversion, or other
sentencing method that results in an ultimate dismissal of a domestic violence conviction,
undermines the court’s goals).
165
See GEORGIA COALITION, supra note 111, at 45 (finding that holding and eventually
dismissing domestic violence cases only lessens perpetrator accountability and therefore
decreases victim safety); Hooper, supra note 81, at 170 (“[I]t was quite easy for an offender
to get diversion and avoid any accountability for his violence against a female partner.”);
SACK, supra note 26, at 23 (stating that the ultimate goal of dispositions in domestic violence
cases should be to stop the violence, keep the victims safe, and hold perpetrators
accountable).
166
Sadusky, supra note 75, at 7.
167
See Hopkins, supra note 83, at 328 (“Requiring batterers to admit to their behavior can
help initiate the steps towards permanent behavioral change.”); VENTURA & DAVIS, supra
note 120, at 16 (concluding that domestic violence convictions had a significant impact on
recidivism among batterers and recommending that aggressive, evidence-based
prosecution should continue); see also Hooper, supra note 81, at 171–72 (concluding that a
California bill prohibiting diversions in domestic violence cases requires a batterer to
acknowledge the violence and that it was wrong to ensure that the post-conviction
counseling required by his probation will be more effective).
168
See Hopkins, supra note 83, at 325 (stating that a victim’s opportunity to publicly
recount the experience as well as hearing public acknowledgment of wrongdoing by the
abuser can aid the victim’s recovery).
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violence on the victim, and even deny that it ever occurred.169 This
denial takes place not only with the victim, friends, and family members,
but a batterer may even deny to himself the seriousness of the violence
and his responsibility for it.170 A batterer’s acceptance of responsibility
for the violence both diminishes his ability to deny prior violence and
limits his ability “to get away with future violence so easily.”171
Finally, pretrial diversion programs fail to recognize the severity of
domestic violence crimes. By consistently diverting domestic violence
cases, prosecutors convey a message that domestic abuse is a private
matter rather than a serious crime.172 This results in the victim feeling
that she has been abused again by the judicial system.173 At least one
scholar suggests “state approaches that involve coercive and dismissive
tactics may effectively revictimize the battered woman, first by
reinforcing the batterer’s judgments of her, and then by silencing her still
further by limiting how she can proceed.”174 On the contrary, if
consequences and accountability were imposed upon batterers, the
victim would receive the message that the crime committed against her

169
See id. at 325–26 (suggesting that an offender’s public admission of wrongdoing can
help to “undo” the abuser’s denial of the violence).
170
See id. at 326 (explaining the resulting doubt family and friends feel toward the victim
when an abuser denies the violence that happened in private); Hooper, supra note 81, at 170
(discussing the use of diversion as a “dumping ground” for domestic violence and the
resulting environment in which a spousal abuse charge was not viewed as serious by either
the court or the offender). “Offenders were not required to admit that they had done
anything wrong, so they viewed the program as a means of expunging the record of the
incident rather than as a means of improving their behavior.” Id. at 171.
171
Hopkins, supra note 83, at 326. This Note does not discuss methods of requiring
offender accountability beyond eliminating pretrial diversions. At least one scholar has
suggested increasing public awareness of a batter’s prior offenses through a system she
refers to as “The Scarlet Letter Proposal” in which protective order databases would be
made public. See generally Elaine M. Chiu, That Guy’s a Batterer!: A Scarlet Letter Approach to
Domestic Violence in the Information Age, 44 FAM. L.Q. 255, 257 (2010) (suggesting that
making a perpetrator’s acts of domestic violence public would allow women to be
proactive in avoiding batterers).
172
See Reynolds, supra note 47, at 427 (discussing the public policy implications that
result from the criminal justice system’s handling of domestic violence cases); Bell et al.,
supra note 57, at 81 (stressing that the judge’s behavior can send a powerful message to
both offenders and victims about the importance, or unimportance, of domestic abuse).
173
See Mills, supra note 58, at 556 (criticizing typical state actors’ handling of domestic
violence cases). Domestic violence victims reported feeling frustrated by court dispositions
that seemed to provide little or no consequences for the abuser’s behavior. Bell et al., supra
note 57, at 80. Victims also expressed displeasure with a lack of enforcement regarding the
court’s dispositions and felt they were left without the help they needed and that offenders
received the message that the court could be ignored. Id.
174
Mills, supra note 58, at 556.

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol49/iss1/14

Goddard: When It's the First Time Every Time: Eliminating the "Clean Slat

2014]

The First Time Every Time

303

is wrong.175 Some scholars suggest that such a message by our criminal
justice system would be perhaps the greatest condemnation of domestic
abuse available.176 Further, at least one court has reasoned that when
compared to abuse against a stranger, domestic abuse “should not be
excusable or somehow less egregious because one is in a marriage or
partnership. In these circumstances, the court must provide the forum to
call abusers to account for their actions.”177
In short, a batterer’s acceptance of accountability is crucial to
preventing recurrences of domestic violence, as well as to providing the
victim with a sense that justice has been served.178 At a minimum,
diversion diminishes the severity of the crime that has been committed
against a victim, and causes the victim to feel that the system failed.179

Hopkins, supra note 83, at 326–27; Bell et al., supra note 57, at 78–79 (discussing the
strong impact of a judge’s disapproval and explicitly denouncing abuse). Many of the
victims studied reported feeling appreciative of a judge’s support, even when the abuse
was not reduced. Id. at 79.
176
Hopkins, supra note 83, at 326–27; see Hooper, supra note 81, at 172 (discussing a
California bill prohibiting diversion in cases involving violence against a partner). The bill
sends a message that domestic violence is a serious crime by requiring such cases to be
prosecuted rather than permitting the charge to be expunged. Id. On the contrary, when a
court chooses not to make domestic violence cases a priority, it essentially “[makes] the
choice the other way around.” Salzman, supra note 120, at 339 (quoting Chief Probation
Officer Andrew Klein).
177
Ohio v. Busch, 669 N.E.2d 1125, 1129 (Ohio 1996) (Stratton, J., concurring); see
Robbins, supra note 59, at 205–06 (“The only way to effectively diminish [domestic
violence] is through the full force of the criminal justice system, which must treat domestic
violence the same as it treats crime by strangers.”).
“Nonprosecution and
underprosecution . . . of domestic violence charges is tantamount to ‘de facto criminalization
of domestic abuse’ which is clearly unconstitutional.” Robbins, supra note 59, at 230–31
(quoting Mary E. Asmus et al., Prosecuting Domestic Abuse Cases in Duluth: Developing
Effective Prosecution Strategies from Understanding the Dynamics of Abusive Relationships, 15
HAMLINE L. REV. 115, 117 (1991)).
178
See Bell et al., supra note 57, at 77 (examining a study of battered women’s responses to
court interventions, in which many victims expressed that a helpful part of the court
intervention was getting the abuse “on the record” as well as to “create consequences” and
“hold him accountable.”); GEORGIA COALITION, supra note 111, at 45 (finding that holding
and eventually dismissing domestic violence cases only lessens perpetrator accountability
and therefore decreases victim safety); Hooper, supra note 81, at 170 (“[I]t was quite easy
for an offender to get diversion and avoid any accountability for his violence against a
female partner.”); Hopkins, supra note 83, at 328 (“Requiring batterers to admit to their
behavior can help initiate the steps towards permanent behavioral change.”); VENTURA &
DAVIS, supra note 120, at 16 (concluding that domestic violence convictions had a
significant impact on recidivism among batterers and recommending that aggressive,
evidence-based prosecution should continue).
179
See Cooper, supra note 129, at 670 (discussing the impact on victims and society of the
criminal justice system’s handling of domestic violence offenses). In commentary to its
Model Code on Domestic and Family Violence, the National Council of Juvenile and
Family Court Judges explains:
175
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Too often, diversion creates a dangerous combination by failing to
protect the victim while allowing the batterer to avoid a conviction and
shirk responsibility for his actions.180 Most ominous, diversions serve to
maintain the status quo with regard to the abuser’s ability to own a
firearm.181
IV. CONTRIBUTION
The problems that arise from diversions in domestic violence cases
can be remedied by simply eliminating their use. This can be
accomplished through several avenues with varying degrees of legal
difficulty. The most effective, but most drastic, means of implementation
is federal legislation prohibiting the use of diversion agreements for
perpetrators of domestic violence.182 A less sweeping approach is the
enactment of similar legislation at the state level.183 Another effective,
although even narrower method, is the rejection of diversion agreements

The Model Code departs from state statutes or practices that approve
pretrial diversion or deferred prosecution programs for perpetrators of
domestic or family violence for many reasons. Pretrial diversion or
deferred prosecution programs for these perpetrators convey the
notion that domestic or family violence does not constitute serious
crime. It is particularly inappropriate when other violent offenders are
not eligible for similar enrollment. Second, domestic and family
violence cases are difficult to prosecute successfully after failed
diversion; and thus noncompliance may result in charges being
dismissed, whereas the immediate imposition of sentence; including
possible incarceration, upon failure of the perpetrator to successfully
complete a program of deferred sentencing serves as a more powerful
deterrent. Third, professionals offering specialized treatment or
counseling programs for perpetrators prefer that participants
mandated to counseling have acknowledged the use of violence
toward the victim.
NATIONAL COUNCIL OF JUVENILE AND FAMILY COURT JUDGES, supra note 97 at 15–16.
180
See supra Part III.B.3 (discussing the social consequences associated with pretrial
diversions).
181
See GEORGIA COALITION, supra note 111, at 39 (finding that when abusers receive a
diversion, they cannot be held accountable for their firearm possession and recommending
that judges consistently issue orders for the removal of firearms from domestic abusers and
that diversion should not typically be granted in such cases); Mikos, supra note 103, at 1460
(explaining that defendants can “skirt the Lautenberg ban” by agreeing to a disposition
that does not result in a conviction).
182
See infra Part IV.A (proposing and analyzing a federal approach to eliminating
diversion in domestic violence cases).
183
See infra Part IV.B (offering and evaluating a state approach that would prohibit
diversion in domestic abuse prosecutions).
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in domestic violence cases by prosecutors and judges.184 Each of these
approaches will be explored in turn.
A. Federal Approach
The most effective means of implementation, especially in terms of
preventing batterers from circumventing the Lautenberg Amendment, is
for Congress to add language to the Amendment that would prohibit the
use of pretrial diversions for domestic violence crimes. This change will
require amendments to two existing statutes. The first is the addition of
a definition of a diversion to 18 U.S.C. § 921. This addition to the present
regulation should read as follows:
(36) The term “diversion” means any agreement in a criminal
prosecution that results in a disposition of criminal charges
which does not result in an entry of a conviction on the
criminal record of the accused individual.185
The second part of the proposed amendment would follow 18
U.S.C. § 922(z), and would consist of an additional subsection, which
would provide:
(aa) No court shall approve diversion in a criminal case
involving any charge in which a conviction would restrict an
individual’s right to possess a firearm under this section.186
An alternative means of federal legislation involves implementing an
additional section in Title 42, Chapter 136, Subchapter III, in the Violence
Against Women Act Improvements. This section would be codified in 42
U.S.C. § 14017 and provide as follows:
No court shall approve diversion for an accused perpetrator in
a criminal case involving domestic violence.187

184
See infra Part IV.C (suggesting that prosecutors and judges avoid using pretrial
diversions as a means of resolving domestic violence cases in their individual jurisdictions).
185
This Note proposes an amendment to 18 U.S.C. § 921 (2012). The text that appears in
italics is the proposed language that the author wishes to add.
186
This Note proposes an amendment to 18 U.S.C. § 922 (2012). The text that appears in
italics is the proposed language that the author wishes to add.
187
This Note proposes the creation of 42 U.S.C. § 14017. The text that appears in italics is
the proposed language that the author wishes to add.
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B. State Approach
Another effective, yet less drastic, means to implement the solution
is the establishment of legislation to eliminate diversion programs in
domestic violence cases at the state level. The federal government can
require such legislation by conditioning the receipt of federal grants
upon a state’s compliance. Such a statute currently exists in Utah and
should be used as a model for other states to follow.188 A state can
accomplish this by simply adding one provision either to existing
statutes on pretrial diversion programs or to existing statutes relating to
domestic violence. For example, the Indiana statute that authorizes
pretrial diversion programs would read as follows:
(c) This section does not apply to a person:
(1) who is arrested for or charged with an offense under
IC 35-42-2-1.3; or
(1) (2) who is arrested for or charged with an offense
under:
(A) IC 7.1-5-7-7(a), if the alleged offense
occurred while the person was operating a
motor vehicle;
(B) IC 9-30-4-8(a), if the alleged offense occurred
while the person was operating a motor vehicle;
(C) IC 35-42-2-2(c)(1);
(D) IC 35-44.1-2-13(b)(1); or
(E) IC 35-43-1-2(a), if the alleged offense
occurred while the person was operating a
motor vehicle; and
(2) (3) who held a probationary license (as defined in
IC 9-24-11-3.3(b)) and was less than eighteen (18)
years of age at the time of the alleged offense.189
Alternatively, Indiana’s criminal statute pertaining to domestic violence
offenses could be modified to include the following provision:
(d) The court may not approve diversion for a perpetrator of
domestic violence.190

UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-36-2.7(6) (West 2014).
This Note proposes an amendment to IND. CODE § 33-39-1-8 (2008). The normal font is
the language of the original statute. The text that appears in italics is the proposed
language the author wishes to add, and the language with a line through it is the language
the author wishes to strike from the original statute.
188
189
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Rather than granting diversions, states should require that plea
agreements offered in domestic violence cases result in a conviction on
the offender’s record and include the offender’s participation in a
batterer’s intervention program or similar rehabilitative sessions. In
cases involving victims who are unwilling to testify against an abuser,
the victim should be considered an unavailable witness under the state’s
rules of evidence.
C. Jurisdictional Approach
Absent both federal and state legislation, a third, less sweeping
scenario exists to accomplish the goal of eliminating diversions for
domestic batterers. Individual prosecutors and judges should simply
use their considerable discretion to eliminate the use of pretrial
diversions in domestic violence cases within their jurisdictions.
Although the use of diversions is commonplace in many areas,
prosecutors are not required to provide this option to batterers, nor is a
judge required to approve an agreement that he does not find to be
just.191 Rather, a judge is free to reject diversions or plea agreements that
contain terms with which he does not agree.192
D. Counterarguments
Counterarguments to such a proposal are likely to center on the
areas of judicial efficiency, financial resources, and victim cooperation.193
Each of these concerns can be addressed in some other manner.194 For
example, judicial efficiency can still be obtained through the use of plea
agreements that require a conviction to be entered against the abuser.
This Note proposes an amendment to IND. CODE § 35-42-2-1.3 (2014). The text that
appears in italics is the proposed language the author wishes to add.
191
See Reynolds supra note 47, at 430 (discussing a prosecutor’s discretion in determining
what cases should be eligible for pretrial diversion).
192
Boling Interview, supra note 70. Referee Boling has a policy by which he does not
accept pretrial diversions or plea agreements in domestic violence crimes when the victim
has not indicated approval of the arrangement or when he does not believe such approval
was voluntary. Id.
193
See Reynolds supra note 47, at 426 (listing reasons in favor of pretrial diversion as:
judicial economy, criminal justice resources, victims’ unwillingness to testify resulting in
no-win cases, parties’ desire to preserve whatever is left of a marital relationship, and
intrafamily assault cases frequently characterized by the victim and offender as
noncriminal).
194
See NAT’L COUNCIL OF JUVENILE AND FAMILY COURT JUDGES, supra note 97, at 16
(providing deferred sentencing as an alternative disposition for domestic violence crimes).
The National Council of Juvenile and Family Court Judges explains “[t]he benefits of
expedited disposition, including judicial and prosecutorial economies and victim
cooperation, are realized by the option of deferred sentencing.” Id.
190
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Plea agreements can also include fines so that the revenue previously
generated by diversions is not forfeited. The judicial resources expended
in eliminating diversions are likely to be offset, at least in part, by
reduced recidivism, which will reduce future demands on judicial
resources.
It may be argued that eliminating the option of pretrial diversion in
domestic violence cases will lead to an increase in the number of cases
taken to trial, and therefore will increase the strain on the judicial
system.195 However, one should consider that the cost of a trial for a
domestic violence offense is far less than the cost of the murder trial that
may be prevented.196 Further, at least one scholar has suggested that
costs associated with reforming the domestic violence system “should be
viewed as an investment in strengthening the infrastructure of our
society.”197
Proponents of pretrial diversion programs are likely to point out the
potential pitfalls of uncooperative victims. As previously discussed,
domestic violence cases can be successfully prosecuted even absent
victim participation.198 The Utah statute that prohibits diversion for
domestic violence contains a provision that permits the victim to be
treated as an unavailable witness under the rules of evidence.199 This
means that her statements to law enforcement officers could be
admissible in a trial, in addition to the testimony of other witnesses and
any other evidence that may be available in the particular case. It is
already a common practice in some jurisdictions for prosecutors to offer
a recording of a 911 call, as well as statements made by the caller to
responding police officers, as evidence in a domestic violence
prosecution.200 As such, lack of victim participation in a domestic
violence case is not an insurmountable hurdle for the prosecution, and
such cases should still be tried when necessary.
In sum, prohibiting the use of diversions in domestic violence
prosecutions is an ideal solution to the numerous problems such
diversions create. Without diversion as an option, a batterer would
See Sadusky supra note 75, at 3 (listing the goals of pretrial diversion programs,
including “to reduce the costs and caseload burdens on district courts and the criminal
justice system.”).
196
See GEORGIA COALITION, supra note 111, at 46 (“[t]ougher prosecution and victim
centered advocacy can provide an opportunity for homicide prevention.”).
197
Durham, supra note 46, at 643.
198
See supra note 61 and accompanying text (discussing non-coercive no-drop policies
and the types of evidence that can be used by prosecutors in lieu of victim testimony).
199
UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-36-2.7 (West 2014).
200
See Friedman & McCormack, supra note 61, at 1174–75 (describing prosecutors’ use
and courts’ acceptance of 911 calls and follow-up conversations as evidence in a criminal
domestic violence trial).
195
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receive a conviction for his crime. He would be prevented from lawfully
owning a firearm and would be subject to stricter punishments if he
were to reoffend. Furthermore, he would be required to accept
accountability for his actions and the crime he committed would be
viewed with the severity it warrants.
V. CONCLUSION
Domestic violence is an epidemic in the United States with no simple
solution. Although an effective remedy has yet to be identified, it is
possible to eliminate judicial practices that compound the problem. The
inherent harms associated with the use of diversion in domestic violence
cases should preclude its consideration as a means of disposition in such
prosecutions. Diversion agreements circumvent targeted gun control
laws, as well as statutory penalty enhancements for repeat offenses.
They also allow batterers to avoid accountability for the violence they
inflict on their intimate partners.
Eliminating the use of diversions for domestic violence crimes will
close the loopholes in the Lautenberg Amendment and similar state
legislation. It will also make abusers subject to state laws designed to
impose stricter penalties for repeat offenses. Finally, removing the
option of diversions will require domestic batterers to accept
responsibility for their crimes and will help convey the message that
domestic violence is a serious matter that the criminal justice system
regards as being worthy of its resources. Only when the true severity of
domestic violence is recognized throughout society will this plague be
eliminated. The justice system must treat domestic abuse as a crime and
punish abusers as criminals.
A statute eliminating diversion arrangements in domestic abuse
prosecutions would have protected Samantha Miller and countless other
women who have been murdered by their spouses or intimate
partners.201 Without the availability of a diversion on his original
domestic assault charge, Timothy Putnam would have been forced to
either plead guilty to his crime or risk being found guilty by a jury at
trial. In either scenario, his criminal record would likely have reflected a
conviction.
That conviction would have required him to take
accountability for his actions and could have required him to complete
treatment for the psychological problems he was suffering. That
conviction would have barred him from legally owning a handgun,
including his military service weapon. That conviction could have

201

See supra Part I (detailing the circumstances surrounding Samantha Miller’s murder).
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prevented Samantha Miller’s six children from losing their mother at the
hands of a gun-wielding domestic abuser.
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